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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE

Like Kaczynski, I worry about technology’s encroachments upon
privacy and other cherished American freedoms Somewhat like
Kaczynski, I have mixed feelings about the mixed blessings o f technology.
(Mello, 1999, p. 20)

Theodore John Kaczynski, known by most of the general public as the
“Unabomber,” pleaded guilty to a number of bombings sent through the mail between the
years 1978 and 1995. His plea was announced on January 22nd, 1998. The trial itself
received substantial media coverage. As Mello (1999) states, “Seventy-five news
organizations congregated at ‘Club Ted,’ a parking lot near the Sacramento courtroom.”
While much of the attention drawn to Kaczynski and the case was due to the fact that
three people were killed and a number injured during his stint as the “Unabomber,” part of
what captivated the general public as well as the media was both the man’s convictions
and the man himself. Kaczynski had been a rather innocuous professor of mathematics at
the prominent University of California at Berkeley before retreating to Montana and
becoming a hermit. He received his degree in Mathematics from Harvard at the age of
twenty. Most importantly, though, were his ideas concerning technology and modem
society. They were Kaczynski’s justification for why he had become a serial bomber.
Kaczynski’s arguments that technology has taken too much control over our lives and that
a revolution against it (along with modem society) is necessary were first made public in
June of 1995, when his Manifesto (1995) appeared in The Washington Post. Today, an
Internet search of unabomber manifesto will pull between forty and fifty-thousand sites
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that either briefly mention the man, the case, the Manifesto, or discuss in detail his views
regarding technology and society. Some websites even provide full texts of the 52-page
Manifesto1. This thesis will examine technology as it gets discussed with respect to
modern-day society. First, it is important to discuss the role of technology in society.
“Technology” refers to a complex phenomenon which appears to be receiving
more and more discussion with each new innovation that gets applied to the everyday
world and the everyday lives of its inhabitants2. Borgmann (1984) describes technology as
being the characteristic way in which we engage the world. Essentially, technology is
presented as paradigmatic; it is focal to our reality. In other words, everything about our
lives is either implicated within or has implications for the technological paradigm3. This
requires further explication. For example, when we are at work, at home, on vacation, or
engaged in a hobby, technology is ever-present. There do exist instances in which we are
far removed from technological innovation. However, these situations are usually a
response to technology. That is, we are making a choice to be removed from technology
as best we can in order to “get away from it all.” If this were the case in 1984, it is
certainly no less the case as we close out the century and prepare to enter a new one. For
the purposes of this research, I will characterize technology more specifically as: a) a set
o f artifacts made by humans, b) an institution that includes the “engineering” and
reshaping o f our world, and c) an attitude. Naturally, one might expect there to be rather
strong views concerning technology and its implications for modern-day society.
Don Hide (1993) identifies five main arguments taken in response to the concerns
over technology with respect to an issue that has come to the forefront in the 1990's: the
2

environment4. The first claims that modem technologies are still developing, and will
evolve into more positive and refined technologies capable of handling environmental
problems. The second argument advocates a “scale-down” approach to technology in
general. Control has become too difficult via centralization. A more decentralized and
smaller scale approach is what is needed. The third argument Ihde refers to as a more
radical group of “alternative technology positions,” seeking alternative models for
technologies in both understanding and context. Deep ecologists and ecofeminists fall
within this group, he argues. The fourth and perhaps most extreme position Ihde labels
the catastrophic position. Modem technologies are viewed to be no longer controllable,
and are “run-away or autonomous.” Technology gets reified to a transcendental role,
according to this argument. “Only a catastrophe of some sort could reverse the situation”
(p. 92), as the idea of technology being “deterministic” can be taken as a synonym. The
fifth and final position Ihde discusses, he calls the postmodernist position. It argues that
modernity, “which includes the basic structures of technoscience, is already coming to an
end.” That is, society is entering a different kind of reality, one which includes, among
other things, the element of virtual reality. The economy is of special significance here.
Information is now being regarded as the most precious resource, replacing the likes of
coal, iron ore, plastics, etc. The postmodernist position rejects any return to past models
as an outcome because the social structure of which we are a part possesses a natural
tendency to move forward. This is not to say that information has to become our most
precious resource of the future, but rather that we as a society, in moving forward, are
choosing this to be so.
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Ted Kaczynski can be associated rather clearly with the catastrophic position Ihde
discusses. Kaczynski argues that technology takes the form of an over-arching “system,”
whereby individuals are forced to function within the confines of the system’s demands
and requirements. He maintains that the system limits individual autonomy, or freedom,
and that the only way for the human species to re-capture the levels of autonomy that he
argues were prevalent during the period of primitive man is to revolt against the
technological system in such a mass, cohesive way as to extirpate all that constitutes
modern-day society. For Kaczynski, this entails what can be perceived to be a
catastrophe. This may be our only option, he asserts, for the path to human fulfillment has
been occluded by technology and its ramifications. He argues that a catastrophe is
preferred over the alternative future which, among other things, likely entails the genetic
engineering of human beings.
While Kaczynski can be identified with the catastrophic position, Robert Pirsig
(1974) argues that we can, in fact, reconcile technology with modem society in such a
way as to obviate such catastrophes. Pirsig, in his well-known work, Zen and the Art of
Motorcycle Maintenance, assesses the problem of technology through individual terms.
He argues that if, at the level of the individual, values are shifted to involve and ensure
caring, gumption, and Quality (with a capital “Q”), feelings such as alienation and
frustration that seem to be becoming more and more prominent in modern-day society will
essentially be alleviated. The individual can find fulfillment if a re-orientation of values
occurs. For Kaczynski, true fulfillment can only be acquired through a revolution against
technology, not a reformation within it.
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The purpose of this research then is to examine the way two texts: Theodore
Kaczynski’s Manifesto (sometimes referred to as the “Unabomber Manifesto”) and Robert
Pirsig’s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, choose to discuss the phenomenon
of technology with respect to society. It is important to stress that I am examining
representations of the phenomenon of technology. In other words, explored here is how
Pirsig and Kaczynski first represent the phenomenon, and then argue for how we as a
society ought to cope with it given modern-day structure. What follows is a discussion of
why these two texts are being chosen as part of the present inquiry into the phenomenon
of technology.

Discussing Technology
The first and most obvious reason for selecting these texts is that they both address
the phenomenon of technology. More importantly, though, is that both artifacts discuss
the phenomenon as a whole, rather than examining only certain aspects of it. In other
words, instead of looking at how one particular technological innovation is utilized,
incorporated into society, or influential, Pirsig and Kaczynski choose to examine
technology in general, and how this phenomenon as a whole is to be coped with in our
society. That is, both authors treat technology as a material, social, and psychological
institution. While a discussion of this magnitude has the potential to become unclear and
inaccurate, being so far-reaching and ambitious, one cannot help but feel these types of
discussions are more significant and meaningful with regards to how we live our lives each
day (presuming the discussions are presented well). Both Pirsig and Kaczynski wrestle
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with technology, and wind up with completely different “recommendations” for how we as
a society ought to deal with the reality it has created for us.
Different means for reconciliation
Although Pirsig and Kaczynski both address the phenomenon of technology, they
do so in different ways, as I’ve briefly already mentioned. Kaczynski argues that the
“system,” described as technological society and the constraints technology has imposed
upon the individual, has taken autonomy and the fulfilling life away from the individual.
For example, he argues: “...in our society the effort needed to satisfy the biological needs
has been reduced to triviality. More importantly, in our society people do not satisfy their
biological needs AUTONOMOUSLY but by functioning as parts of an immense social
machine” (p. 8). The only way one is to procure for him/herself the kind of freedom
associated with the fulfilling life as s/he sees it is by mass revolt against modem society.
Kaczynski concedes that this will be catastrophic to a certain degree. Individuals will have
to endure a harsh period of adjustment toward more primitive ways. However, he claims
it to be better than the projected alternative, arguing that things will only get worse the
longer the collective unit of society waits to revolt.
Pirsig on the other hand believes that if the individual re-orients his/her values to
place a higher emphasis on caring gumption, and Quality in one’s work,
hobbies... etc., then progress can be made toward a reconciliation of technology with
society. Pirsig writes:
Believe me, when the world is seen not as a duality o f mind
and matter but as a trinity o f quality, mind, and matter, then the art
of motorcycle maintenance and other arts take on a dimension
o f meaning they never had. The spector of technology becomes

not an evil but a positive, fun thing, (p. 221)

Unlike Kaczynski, who claims the problem of technology has transcended individual levels
to reach more systemic ones, Pirsig assesses the problem at the individual level, arguing
that it is at this level where goals must be set and progress can be made. In other words,
people can find fulfillment, even within modem society, if they reflect on and follow their
individual values.
Both Kaczynski and Pirsig agree that technology has at least reduced for the
individual what is perceived to be a fulfilling lifestyle. That is, living in a technologicallydeveloped society has left people with, at least sometimes, feelings of frustration toward
and alienation from the society in which they live. Both argue that freedom, or autonomy,
is limited in such a society. Yet, the two authors not only assess the problem in different
terms (or on different levels), but proceed into completely different recommendations for
how we as a society ought to cope with technology. Additionally, the two texts are
disparate in terms of time (Pirsig’s was published in 1974, Kaczynski’s was made public in
1995), purpose, style, and audience. By analyzing both texts, I will provide a more
thorough conceptualization of the phenomenon of technology. As mentioned, technology
is a complex phenomenon, one with a broad scope and many viewpoints concerning the
ways it should be approached. The analysis presented here examines two of these
viewpoints, delineating how they are similar and different in the way each structures its
argument.

One Cultural Artifact and One with Potential
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Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is certainly a cultural artifact. Since
its publication in 1974, it has sold more than three million copies worldwide.
Consequently, it has “reached” the public at-large, far beyond the academic circle. Pirsig
(1974) notes in the ten-year afterward of the text that the book was submitted to 122
publishers, and only one picked it up. Of course, one is all you need. He goes on to note
that the publisher offered him a standard nominal fee, and that he probably shouldn’t
expect anything more. However, the end result was quite different. Soon after the book’s
release, critical acclaim followed. This led to numerous television and radio interviews,
along with multiple lecture invitations (Pirsig, 1974). There have been many a discussion
of Quality in cities other than Bozeman, Montana, no doubt5. Pirsig’s discussion of
technology and Quality is a complex one, and it is a tribute to both his writing style and
the nature of the discussion itself that it has been so well received. While its acceptance in
the academic circle is seen as appropriate, it is probably surprising even to Pirsig that it has
been so embraced by the mainstream.
Kaczynski’s Manifesto is not considered to be a cultural artifact —at least not yet.
Nor has Kaczynski acquired the type of reverence bestowed upon Pirsig. Part of the
reason the Manifesto is not and may never be a cultural artifact is that most of the
American public conjecturally desires to condemn Kaczynski’s message because of the evil
of the messenger. While both Pirsig and Kaczynski employ rhetorical means in attempting
to persuade audiences through their texts, it is Kaczynski that also employs non-rhetorical
means when he murders individuals in an effort to create a more powerful and lasting
message. Thus, many may dismiss an analysis of the Manifesto simply on the claim that he
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is a “nutcase.” However, this claim must be attached to its proper place. While few
would disagree Kaczynski was wrong in his extreme course of action and probably even
crazy, the Manifesto, when taken on its own merit, presents some interesting arguments,
ones which even Michael Mello (1999) is compelled to agree with (see passage at
beginning of this paper). Mello is a former defense attorney and current anti-capital
punishment activist. He is not the only one identifying with at least some parts of the
Manifesto. The fact that there are so many web-sites out there addressing Kaczynski, the
Manifesto, or both, suggests that people are at least discussing the viewpoint he presents6.
Many of the sites do disagree with Kaczynski, citing the dubious nature of some of his
predictions, but there are also many advocating the kind of action he calls for. Kaczynski
has captured much attention outside of the academic circle, while echoing noted
philosophy of technology scholars such as Ellul (1964) and Marcuse (1968). Ellul argues
that a technological society cannot be civilized, and its end is not freedom, but the
opposite of freedom. By this he means that for all the liberation technology is supposed to
provide, it in fact imposes more constraints upon the individual. These constraints, taking
the form of trivialities for which we are forced to hold ourselves accountable to, reduce
our levels of freedom. For example, in modern-day society it is not uncommon for
individuals to possess multiple forms of communication, such as electronic mail, pagers,
fax machines, and cellular phones. We are expected to respond to messages that we
receive through these mediums. In this regard, it is a burden for us to be held accountable
for so many forms of communication. This is not to say that we do not appreciate being
so accessible, and being able to access others when we need to. Rather, it is that by their
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very nature we are constrained by all of these communication mediums because they force
us to be responsible for them.
Marcuse gets precisely at Kaczynski’s claim that humans cannot properly engage
the power process in a technological setting (this will be further explicated in the next
section) when he argues that in such a society, all basic needs (food, clothing, shelter,
health) are satisfied, and only non-necessary needs become the goal. Thus, individuals
only indirectly provide for their vital needs. This is accomplished usually through a job of
some sort, where one works to earn money, and then uses this money to procure for
oneself food, clothing, shelter...etc. The “procuring for oneself’ these vital needs, though,
is all too often accomplished through others. For example, we allow others to build our
homes; we purchase clothing from department stores that was made by individuals other
than ourselves; and we often buy pre-cooked or pre-prepared food from supermarkets
(this does not include meals we eat at restaurants or fast-food chains). As a result of not
being able to directly provide for our vital needs, we set goals that reflect materialistic
needs, such as a bigger home, a nicer car, or a larger salary. The preceding comments
appear to justify an inquiry into the Manifesto, particularly when analyzed alongside an
“opposing” text, such as Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.
What must be taken up in what follows is a more in-depth discussion of the texts at
hand. Additionally, the structure and style of each text will be examined. Differences and
similarities will be addressed in more detail in this section. The fact that these two texts
are separated by approximately twenty years is not to be overlooked. However, that
Kaczynski is being discussed and Pirsig is still being discussed also are important points.
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Both texts are worthy artifacts for analysis regarding the phenomenon of technology in
society. Consequently, the following research questions are posed:
RQ1: In what ways do Kaczynski and Pirsig discuss the issue o f technology with
respect to society?
RQ2: How are Kaczynski and Pirsig similar and different in the ways they
discuss technology with respect to society?
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CHAPTER 2: THE TWO TEXTS

John and Sylvia, who are friends of the narrator’s in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
Maintenance, readily express their displeasure with what they call “The System.” Pirsig
first takes notice of their frustration when John experiences trouble with his own
motorcycle, a BMW-R60. He wants nothing to do with learning how to fix his
motorcycle, or how to prevent mishaps. He is only concerned that it is performing
properly. Pirsig knows there is something deep and worth exploring in John’s frustration,
but is unable to put his finger on it until one day, when he is at John and Sylvia’s home,
the faucet is dripping, and he remembers that is has been dripping for quite a long time.
John mentions that he tried to fix it with a new faucet washer, but was unsuccessful.
Some time later, Pirsig is again at their home, the faucet is still dripping (rather irritatingly,
he remarks), and while he is talking to Sylvia her kids come into the kitchen. She
completely snaps at the kids, but Pirsig realizes that the faucet is at least part of the reason
why she is so irritated. Sylvia later mentions her irritation at a friend who thought that
computer programming was “interesting.” Pirsig concludes that it isn’t any specific
technological product they express displeasure with, “...it’s all of technology they hate” (p.
14). He goes on to claim that momentary anger about something deeply hated always gets
suppressed. It’s the entire system which becomes the subject of their aggression. This is
the reason statements such as “There’s just no escape from it all” come forth from John
and Sylvia (p. 14). The ideas Pirsig explores in this book are in large part inspired by John
and Sylvia’s situation.
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Just as there are two themes to Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance —the
narrative of the protagonist (Pirsig) and his son traveling across the country on
motorcycle, and the intellectual framework he develops -- so too are there two characters
who eventually merge into one person7. One of these can simply be called narrator, the
man telling the story and articulating various ideas and thoughts. The other character,
Phaedrus, is the man the narrator used to be. Phaedrus went down a much different path
than the narrator in his exploration of Quality, a path which led to insanity8. Throughout
the book, the narrator pieces together who Phaedrus was and what led to his demise.
It all began while he was an English professor at Montana State University,
specializing in rhetoric, and a colleague of his told him “I hope you are teaching Quality to
your students” (p. 160). Phaedrus nodded, but began to reflect on what this term
“quality” really encompasses. His path proceeded along three phases: a non-metaphysical
one, a metaphysical one, and a mystical one, which was self-destructive. The first, non
metaphysical phase was one in which Quality became a working concept for him in the
teaching of rhetoric. He made no attempt at a systematic definition of what he was talking
about. “It was a happy, fulfilling, creative phase” (p. 168). The second, metaphysical
phase came about as a result of normal intellectual criticism of his lack of a definition of
what Quality entailed. In this phase he made rigid, systematic statements about the nature
of Quality, all the while growing more diffident toward his family, friends, and colleagues.
Phaedrus worked out a massive, hierarchical structure of thought to support it, part of
which involved isolating Quality as neither a part of mind (subjective) or a part of matter
(objective), but rather as a third entity independent of the two.
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The third and final phase, the mystical one, would prove to be Phaedrus’ downfall.
Where Quality was originally seen as either a subjective or objective component of reality,
derived from reality, it had now become for Phaedrus the principle component of reality.
Quality had become an absolute monism. It was the source and substance of everything.
This would eventually lead Phaedrus to a critique of all of Western rationality, the heart of
which he argued is derived from ancient Greece. One crucial aspect to this involves the
Sophistic pedagogy being swept under the rug by Platonic ideals. Toward the end of the
book, the narrator articulates that Phaedrus went insane, and the reason his memory is so
clouded and it is so difficult to piece it together is that Phaedrus underwent electro-shock
therapy as part of the [then] procedure to eliminate his personality in favor of creating a
vacuous one. The narrator chooses a different path, opting to avoid this third, mystical
phase:
Perhaps he would have gone in the direction I’m now about to go in if this
second wave o f crystallization, the meta-physical wave, had finally grounded
out where I’ll be grounding it out, that is, in the everyday world. I think
metaphysics is good if it improves everyday life; otherwise forget it. But
unfortunately for him it didn’t ground out. It went into a third mystical wave o f
crystallization from which he never recovered, (p. 221)

The narrator, in attempting to reconcile Quality with technology, while at the same
time attempting to avoid plummeting into the abyss which captured Phaedrus, addresses
the split between the classical and romantic minds. Classical thinkers, regarding
technology, want to know the intricate details of a device. Using Pirsig’s example of the
motorcycle, “classics” aim to know everything about the bike: how the parts work
together, what goes where, and generally, how the bike manages to operate. “Romantics”
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are less concerned with the components of the bike. They just appreciate it for the ride it
offers the enthusiast.
Pirsig argues that to arrive at Quality, it is necessary to create a kind of marriage
between the classical and romantic styles. If we take the time to both appreciate and
understand technology, or our jobs, or hobbies, or how these utilize technologies, he
would argue, we can avoid much of the alienating and frustrating sentiments that
characterize John and Sylvia. Doing this requires caring on the individual’s part; caring
about their work, their hobbies, the technological innovations they incorporate into their
lives...etc9. Caring is linked to the concept of gumption, in that they both involve the
individual merging the concepts of “self ’ and “object.” Gumption is more specifically
defined as “initiative,” or “common sense actively applied to real life.” For Pirsig,
gumption has similar connotations. In motorcycle maintenance, it is “the psychic gasoline
that keeps the whole thing going.” (p. 273). So instead of separating oneself from one’s
work or hobby, one ought to perceive the two as a working relationship, or partnership.
By this Pirsig simply means that too often individuals feel separated from tasks they are
doing or objects they engage. He argues that, essentially, these tasks and objects are
human creations, and should be perceived as being more connected to individuals than
they are given credit for. Once this connection is achieved (Zen Buddhist philosophy has
as one of its primary tenets the aspiration for “oneness”), the individual is fully engaged
with a task or object. By being fully engaged with these and appreciating them, things not
only get done, but they get done better than if the individual did not feel connected to
them.
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Pirsig isolates what he calls “gumption traps,” of which there are two types:
setbacks and hang-ups. A set-back would involve, for example, not having the right parts
before you while working on your motorcycle. A hang-up could include variables like
boredom and anxiety. These “traps” can deter one from achieving gumption, and
subsequently, Quality. In pursuing Quality, the individual might carefully place all parts
before him/her on sheets of newspaper and carefully take notes on the sequential process
of removing and adding parts to the motorcycle. Additionally, should boredom or anxiety
set in, Pirsig advocates taking some time off from the maintenance process in order to
clear one’s head. Pirsig suggests that these sorts of steps are how one can come to grips
with technology (and modem society) via Quality.
Ted Kaczynski’s Manifesto is far less receptive to the phenomenon of technology
than Robert Pirsig’s work. The Manifesto is approximately 52 pages in length and is
structured as follows. Kaczynski begins by briefly discussing the negative consequences
of the Industrial Revolution. In this introduction, he sets forth the following claim:
We do outline in a very general way the measures that those who hate
the industrial system should take in order to prepare the way for a
revolution against that form o f society. This is not a political revolution.
Its object will be to overthrow not governments but the economic and
technological basis o f the present society, (p. 1)

The next section addresses the “Psychology of Modem Leftism,” and is a strategic move
on his part, first to define what leftism is, and then to isolate his movement from it. He
then moves into defining the power process and surrogate activities, and how these are at
the root of social problems. He follows that with a discussion on the motives of scientists,
and how this relates to a surrogate activity. Next, he discusses the nature of freedom, and
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how its restriction is unavoidable in an industrial society. Technology gets deemed a more
powerful social force than the aspiration for freedom. Finally, Kaczynski discusses how
revolution is “easier” than reform, and how to go about strategically instigating such a
revolution, stating that this will not occur overnight, but will take some time for enough
people to support the position that the present system must be abolished.
Human beings possess a need for what Kaczynski calls the power process. The
power process has four elements to it: goal, effort, attainment of goal, and autonomy.
While the first three are fairly rudimentary, the fourth requires some qualification.
Autonomy is related to individual effort toward goals. Individuals’ efforts must be
undertaken on their own initiative and must be under their own control. Autonomy can be
viewed as being closely related to the notion of freedom. When individuals are not
autonomous in their decision-making (at least to some degree), they often feel as though
their freedom is restricted. He later goes on to tie this into what he perceives as
technology’s stripping of individual autonomy and freedom.
Unlike many theorists who discuss power, Kaczynski does not directly associate
the concept with an assertion of influence by one individual over another in some form of
social relationship. Rather, he directs his discussion of power inward at the level of the
individual, arguing that humans have a need to be able to control their own lives, in a
sense. Kaczynski argues that in modem society this ability to “have control” over one’s
own life is substantially limited as a result of technology. This relates to Lukes’ (1974)
discussion of power, wherein one dimension (Lukes develops three) entails a community
or disadvantaged group that does not know its own best interests. Kaczynski suggests
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that the individuals which constitute modem society do not know their own best interests.
The result of this is an improper engagement'Of the power process and a reliance upon
surrogate activities as a means to procure fulfillment.
Kaczynski mandates that the power process ought to only be associated with
primary or real goals. These types of goals include fulfilling only those vital needs for
survival, such as food, clothing, and shelter. It is important to note that in general modem
society has made the attainment of these goals easy and trivial, according to Kaczynski.
Thus, the power process does not get engaged in any proper and significant manner. The
antithesis of the primary goal is the surrogate activity. Kaczynski explains: “We use the
term ‘surrogate activity’ to designate an activity that is directed toward an artificial goal
that people set up for themselves merely in order to have some goal to work toward, or let
us say, merely for the sake of the ‘fulfillment’ that they get from pursuing the goal”(p.
7)10. Although it does not explicitly state it, it can be assumed that a job or a hobby would
constitute a surrogate activity, as they do not satisfy any of the vital needs in a manner
which engages the power process properly, according to Kaczynski.

Stylistic Similarities and Differences
With respect to style, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance and the
Manifesto can be considered similar in the way they present arguments concerning
technology (“concerning technology” being the key clause here). Both Pirsig and
Kaczynski adopt rational approaches in presenting their respective views on how
technology ought to be reconciled with society. Structurally, they are similar in that both

18

proceed by isolating why it is they feel technology is problematic, followed by how we as a
society ought to solve this problem. But stylistically, both are also similar in that they
present their approaches to technology and society as being rational, logical steps to make
given the problem as they discuss it11. Consequently, rationality is understood here as the
reason-based, logical attempt at understanding in general and progress specifically. It
involves the view that reason and experience rather than nonrational means are the
fundamental criteria in the solution o f problems. It is also important to add that
rationality is to some extent socially constructed, and in this respect a function of
perspective and framing. Kaczynski makes the following argument: “A reform movement
merely offers to solve a particular social problem. A revolutionary movement offers to
solve all problems at one stroke and create a whole new world...” (p. 27), and “...the
bigger the system grows, the more disastrous the consequences of its breakdown will
be...” (p. 33). Pirsig offers the following assertion:
Thus, if the problem o f technological hopelessness is caused by absence of
care, both by technologists and anti-technologists; and if care and Quality are
external and internal aspects o f the same thing, then it follows logically that
what really causes technological hopelessness is absence of the presence o f
Quality in technology by both technologists and anti-technologists, (p. 247-8)

The fact that both Pirsig and Kaczynski present rational arguments regarding technology
and society seems to be overshadowed, though, by the evident distinction between
Kaczynski’s more scientific style and Pirsig’s more poetic approach.
While both authors present rational arguments for how to approach technology,
the difference is that, for Kaczynski, this constitutes his entire text. The Manifesto is
scientific and argumentative, in that each section of the text specifically addresses the ills
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of technology as he sees it and how we as a society ought to respond to such ills12. For
example, Kaczynski asserts:
In this article we give attention to only some o f the negative developments that
have grown out o f the industrial-technological system we do outline in a very
general way the measures that those who hate the industrial system should take
in order to prepare the way [sic] for a revolution against that fomt of society.

(P. 1)
Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, however, has more than one theme, as
mentioned. While one theme to the book is certainly rational in its discussion of
technology, the other is much more poetic through its narrative of the father and son on a
cross-country motorcycle trip. An example of the interplay between these two themes can
be seen in the following passage:
The sky over the other wall o f the canyon has become overcast,
and the wind in the pines around us has become cool and ominous.
At least the coolness makes it easier hiking....
I was talking about the first wave o f crystallization outside
rhetoric that resulted from Phaedrus’ refusal to define Quality. He
had to answer the question, If you can’t define it, what makes
you think it exists? (p. 193)

It is this poetic element that seems to dominant the text, even in the way Pirsig glides back
and forth between narrative and intellectual framework (and his discussion of Phaedrus
within the two). This distinction will become more apparent and relevant in a later
discussion of the ways in which “the body” is implicated by both in their evaluations of the
technological society.
What is now needed is a contextual analysis of how technology and society is
being discussed/evaluated in the American culture. I will turn my attention specifically to
relevant newspaper and magazine articles and/or editorials in an attempt to situate these
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two texts within their appropriate contexts.
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CHAPTER 3: CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

It should come as no surprise that technology has received much attention and
been the focus of numerous discussions in American society. A great deal of this
attention is due to an inundating public response to the issues technology presents, not
merely those responses emanating from the academic community. If we accept
Borgmann’s (1984) notion of technology being the characteristic way in which we engage
the world, then this abundance of attention devoted to it as a phenomenon is both
expected and logical. Because the two texts focused upon in this research are from
different periods in the modem era, the objective here is to capture how technology gets
discussed in the American culture of both the 1970s and 1990s. As a result of this
analysis, a better understanding of the context from which these two texts originate will be
achieved. By no means does this analysis claim to be exhaustive. Rather, the goal is to
procure a representative sample of the ways technology was discussed during these
periods. In doing so, it becomes clear that there were specific events occuring in society
which no doubt contributed to the development of these two texts. For example, there
was consumer frustration over the poor quality of many manufactured products in the
1970s. And in the 1990s, there has existed a kind of “longing” by many to escape urban
America for a more mral, unpolluted lifestyle. In what follows, I will specifically turn to
various newspaper and news magazine articles and editorials in an attempt to capture the
social, economic, and political issues of particular relevance to technology and society.
The 1970s will be discussed first, followed by the 1990s.
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The 1970’s
Reiterating Robert Pirsig’s primary argument concerning technology and society
seems both appropriate and necessary in framing the forthcoming analysis. Pirsig (1974)
asserts that individuals often possess a feeling of alienation from technology and its many
forms and functions. This alienation, he contends, stems from both a lack of
understanding of how technology works (its many functions), and a growing frustration
over the way technological innovations are produced. That is, there exists contempt for
the poor quality of technological innovations or products (its many forms). The solution,
Pirsig argues, lies in an effort on the part of the individual to re-assess one’s own values
when at work, engaged in a hobby or chore... etc. If the individual can eliminate subjectobject dualisms, and pursue Quality, real progress can be made.
The climate of American society in the early and mid - 1970s can best be
characterized as unstable. U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam escalated and declined,
until “peace with honor,” as Nixon proclaimed it, was finally obtained in January of 1973
(Goldman, 1973). Both Nixon and the American public would encounter additional
adversity through the Watergate affair, the impending impeachment of the president, and
his subsequent resignation in 1974.
As if a war and political scandal weren’t enough to occupy the hearts and minds
of Americans, food shortages coupled with a fuel and energy crisis picked up where the
Vietnam War left off. As one Newsweek article (“Summer”, 1973) described, shortages
developed in several areas: food, paper, energy, and natural resources. These shortages
altered the lifestyles of consumers:
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The spreading shortages were wrenching the way millions o f Americans
live and think. They now had to plan ahead. No more simply dropping
into a service station when the fuel gauge was low; instead, many
motorists were getting down to the stations the first thing in the morning
to fill up their tanks. (“Summer”, 1973, p. 70)

The solutions to the energy crisis would have a significant effect on the American
lifestyle.13 It became apparent that “Consumers inescapably will see their bills for
electricity, heating, and gasoline raised ever higher —and they could conceivably find
these necessities being rationed” (“Americas Energy”, 1973).
In addition to the fuel and energy crisis, less abundant food supplies on grocery
store shelves had its impact on the American consumer;
Americans had already changed their eating habits as meat prices soared and
supplies grew tight....With other food items -- poultry, dairy, and flour
products -- now running short, housewives might start grabbing things off
supermarket shelves not because they need them at the moment, but for fear
that they will not be available later on. (“Summer”, 1973, p. 70)

The food shortage contributed to a penny-pinching lifestyle for the consumer. A high cost
of eating is something that hit home everyday for the average American, no doubt (“High
Cost”, 1973). In fact, the average family food bill had risen dramatically in recent years as
well as throughout the year of 1973 (“High Cost”, 1973). Some were forced to seek
cheaper alternatives to daily food staples. For example, something as common as a gallon
of milk had to be replaced with the more inexpensive instant, nonfat dry milk (Letters,
1973a).
All of these factors contributed to what many would consider an economic “devil
term”: inflation. Inflation had actually nudged the Watergate affair aside on the front
pages of newspapers and news magazines across the country (“Other”, 1973). Indeed,
“folks....were more concerned about high prices than high crimes in the administration” (p.
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22). Many will recall the not-so-catchy theme adopted by Nixon’s replacement for the
presidency, Gerald Ford: WIN, or “Whip Inflation Now,” in 1975.
These factors would translate into a more economically conscious consumer. An
example of this can be seen in the push for more practical, inexpensive, and
environmentally friendly automobiles that occurred in 1975. As a result of this, major
auto companies in Detroit “scaled down” their automobile models, releasing a series of
compact, fuel efficient, and less costly vehicles. These were a sharp contrast to what had
been the norm for the American industry up until that point: big, powerful, fuel guzzling
vehicles (“Detroit’s Gamble”, 1975). Many consumers praised the move, recognizing the
economic benefits of the new line of automobiles (Forum, 1975).
While the American consumer was forced to adjust to the changing economic
climate during the early and mid-1970s, other issues would surface that speak to the
growing frustration being experienced. An issue pertaining to Pirsig’s call for a re
assessment of individual values is what one article appropriately termed “The Job Blahs”
(“Job”, 1973). The discussion here is on the workplace, and how both blue-collar and
white-collar workers feel alienated from their jobs, and/or find little to no fulfillment in
them. As one steelworker is cited as stating, “it’s a boring, repetitious job - nasty, hot,
and dirty work. I go there ‘cause I have to” (p. 79). Another autoworker is quoted as
saying, “Everyday, for eight hours, we fight that black devil-chain [the assembly line]” (p.
79). The article attempts to capture the national sentiment regarding this issue:
The mood o f this vast work force is obviously o f tremendous importance to the
country as a whole as well as to the individuals themselves. Worker attitudes
affect productivity While people have been complaining about work since it
was invented, there is a widespread feeling that there is something different
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about today’s discontent, (p. 79)

The article categorizes these types of modern-day workers as:
the new problem children o f the American economy: the “alienated” workers,
afflicted with the blue-collar blues, the white-collar woes and the just plain onthe-job blahs. They are bored, rebellious, frustrated; sometimes they’re drunk
on the job or spaced out on drugs, (p. 79)

Nineteen million part-time or full-time workers were, at this time, engaged in
manufacturing, “and one million of these are tied to the dull, routine tedium of an
assembly line....” (p. 79). If consumers are frustrated with the quality of products
produced by technological means, this seems to offer at least one reason why such a lack
of quality exists. If workers don’t care about the work they’re doing, terms like “quality”
and “the final product” don’t enter into the equation. Some individuals blame the
structure of society for the alienation workers feel from their jobs,
highlighting the transition from school to the work force:
If for twelve years a person is subjected to a situation where emphasis is placed
on the individual, on personal freedom and accomplishment, it’s no wonder
that when that person faces a situation where the emphasis is on the system,
boredom, disillusionment and alienation result. (Letters, 1973b, p. 4).

The lack of enthusiasm many workers felt for their jobs coupled with the poor
quality of manufactured products appears to have been at the heart of much of the
discontent individuals felt for technology and its byproducts. Whitman (1973) writes of
the yearning for the past he experiences. It is his claim that things were simply done better
before technological gadgetry stepped up to the forefront. He opens his essay by stating:
“ ‘Nothing’s like it used to be,’ a friend exclaimed the other day when a plastic-handle
screwdriver came apart in his hands.’ ” (p. 15). At the same time, however, others
acknowledge that while there does exist some shabbiness in present-day craftsmanship, the
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obvious benefits technology has procured should not simply be swept under the rug
(Letters, 1973c).
American consumers were also concerned over the general safety of many of the
products out on the market during this period. As one article reports (“Home Hazards”,
1973), “Each year at least 30 million Americans are hurt and 30,000 killed because of
unsafe consumer products other than autos.” (p. 91). Part of the problem associated with
these products is the way consumers choose to use them (such as playground equipment,
bicycles, cleaning and lighting fluids...etc). However, this did not seem to quiet the overall
public outcry. The Consumer Product Safety Commission was set up by Congress to
evaluate many common household products and create safety standards (“Home
Hazards”, 1973).
The early and mid-1970s presented some interesting discussions concerning
technology and its interplay with society. While the same can be said of the 1990's, the
difference lies in what specifically that discussion is about. Worthy of mention is that the
pace of life has greatly accelerated for most people in industrialized societies since the
1970s. The advent of digital electronics in general, and computer technology more
specifically, has provided this more recent decade with a new set of topics open for
discussion. This particular period more adamantly seeks to address the question of where
technology is taking us (or perhaps leading us).

The 1990s
As with the 1970s, it is important to preface the current analysis with a brief
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discussion of Ted Kaczynski’s primary argument in his Manifesto (1995). Kaczynski
argues that human beings in modem society do not fulfill the power process in any
meaningful way. Instead of meeting one’s vital needs for survival in an autonomous
manner, the individual relies on the “system,” or current-day structure of society, to
procure these needs for him/her. In an attempt to make one’s life fulfilling, he argues that
individuals engage in surrogate activities, such as a job or hobby, but that these activities
do not fulfill for the individual vital needs (food, clothing, shelter...etc) in an autonomous
way. Kaczynski asserts that if the technological system is not brought down by a mass
revolution, it will grow so powerful that it will become unstoppable, and limitations to
human autonomy such as the genetic engineering of individuals will become the norm.
Elmer-Dewitt reported in 1993 that a debate had ensued over the issue of cows
being treated with genetically engineered hormones in order to produce more milk for a
growing society. We as consumers had relatively little say in the matter, except for those
of us living in rural areas who had access to more “natural” milk (i.e., that which was
produced by untreated cows). The National Institute of Health and the Food and Drug
Administration assured consumers that there are no safety hazards associated with milk
from cows that had been treated (Elmer-Dewitt, 1993c). Despite this, the sentiment
loomed that this was just one of the products of living in a largely populated, growing
society. Consumers were, for the most part, forced to adhere to production methods such
as the one mentioned in order to sustain our society.
These types of production methods such as the one just mentioned were a sign of
an ever-growing population. Linden reported (1993) that the world was “about to pass a
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milestone: more people will live in urban areas than in the countryside” (pp. 28-29).
While urban life has provided societies with many benefits, its shortcomings are a relevant
topic for discussion: “A walk through the South Bronx fulfills every outsider’s vision of
urban decline” (p. 35). Some respond to this issue by isolating over-population as the
most pressing problem, while others argue that a lack of proper planning by local
governments is where the fault lies (Linden, 1993). Bonfante (1993) discusses the trend
of many Americans to pack up and move from the metropolises of the east and west
coasts to the Rocky Mountains of Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah and New
Mexico. Deedee Corradini, mayor of Salt Lake City, was reported as saying, “Look at
L.A. or San Francisco. I don’t know how you can begin to solve those problems, whereas
we can solve ours. Our problems are smaller.” (p. 23). The appeal of the “mountain
cities” wasn’t simply its natural landscape. Its lure also involved the qualities of less
crime, fewer inhabitants, and less stress. This appeal has no doubt created tension
between some residents of mountain cities and visitors from the coasts. While some
mountain residents simply ask visitors to adjust to the lifestyle rather than try to re-shape
mountain life into city life (Letters, 1993e), others are more adamant in their hostility:
Invasion o f high-end money earners has spoiled this area for those who have
lived here for generations, forcing the natives to deal with higher real-estate
prices, higher taxes and ruination o f the environment. You can’t expect to
accommodate this immigration without tapping into water, land, air, and other
resources that sustain life. (Letters, 1993e, p. 8)

Just as urban development and its ramifications were receiving significant
discussion, so too was the area of specific technological innovations. The early 1990s
began to see highly significant developments in digital/wireless communications and the
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computer industry. Elmer-Dewitt (1993b) discusses the “electronic superhighway,” and
how the advent of the Internet will lead to a consolidation of home-office mediums, such
as the television, telephone, and fax machine. The expectation is that the individual will
essentially be able to do more while doing less. While many welcome the prospects of
technological innovation, others have suspicions, claiming that such innovation will lead to
an invasion of privacy, this since a record of what individuals do through these mediums
will be stored electronically (Letters, 1993c). Some hold that modem technology will turn
us into “couch potatoes,” as the evil behind such innovation is idleness (Letters, 1993c).
Cyber cultures began to emerge as a result of this technological innovation (ElmerDewitt, 1993a). Its offspring, the cyberpunk, receives its name from cybernetics (“the
science of communication and control theory”) and punk (“an antisocial rebel or
hoodlum”) (p. 59). Elmer-Dewitt characterizes cyberpunk culture as “a way of looking at
the world that combines an infatuation with high-tech tools and a disdain for conventional
ways of using them” (p. 59). Virtual reality equipment is a favorite innovation of the
cyberpunk. The frightening nature of cyber culture comes through in one San Jose State
University mathematician’s characterization of the cyberpunk as being nothing less than
the fusion of humans and machines (Elmer-Dewitt, 1993a). The idea of individuals
becoming so involved with computers and so uninvolved with non-electronic devices casts
eerie suspicions within many. For these respondents, the dehumanizing and unhealthy
attributes associated with cyber culture are enough to repel them. Two more recent
articles suggest that criticism of computer technology continues to profilerate. Chapman
(2000) reveals that increasing numbers of computer experts are challenging corporations
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which try to lock down the internet and secure it for commerce. These “anti-corporation”
groups are proponents of open source software and an open internet. They oppose an
internet absorbed into mass culture, and they do not wish to see corporate logos on every
web-site. Joy (2000) reveals the potential for an even bleaker scenario to unfold.
Cofounder and chief scientist of Sun Microsystems, Joy argues that technological
advances in the computer industry and beyond (e.g., genetic engineering) may prove to
actually threaten the human species. Not surprisingly, Joy references Kaczynski’s
Manifesto, and argues that increased levels of monitoring and perhaps even restriction are
necessary to ensure that technology does not proceed so rapidly that it surpasses human
capabilities to manage it effectively.
Technological development in the computer and communications industries would
receive much more discussion in a special edition of The New York Times Magazine
(NYTM) published in September of 1997. The edition features a slew of articles devoted
to current trends in technological innovation, and how these trends will alter our lives, for
better and for worse. Examples of these include Krugman’s (1997) “The Paper Bag
Revolution.” This piece de-emphasizes all of the mega-expensive, high-tech gadgetry and
instead brings to the foreground the ways in which technology makes our lives easier (e.g.,
the way the Internet can be used in a non-glamorous way to locate certain things such as
the nearest version of a particular department store). Another piece, entitled, “Addicted
to Speed,” by James Gleick (1997), discusses the ways movies and televisions are getting
faster with respect to the imagery they can present and the imagery that gets presented.
Gleick notes in the trailer: “We love the sensation they give us, which is just as well —we
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couldn’t slow them down if we wanted to” (pp. 54-55). He suggests that, while it is fine
that we appreciate this innovation, it is also important to acknowledge the rapid pace at
which such innovation is occurring. One final piece worth noting is Elizabeth Royte’s
(1997) article, “Life as We’ll Know it.” This article examines some of technological
innovations that may surface in the near future. One example of this is the electronic
book, which can hold a million volumes of say, the Library of Congress in its database.
All one needs to do is scroll up or down to whatever it is one is searching for, and it is
presented for them on screen.
The NYTM received a substantial amount of feedback in the form of letters. They
note at the beginning of the “Letters” (1997) section:
Our special issue on technology drew mail from scores o f readers traveling at
all speeds on the information superhighway. Technophiles were outnumbered,
4 to 1, by technophobes, who hold tight to rotary phones and complain that
their children don’t visit friends anymore, except in chat rooms (p. 20).

Though one should be careful not to overgeneralize, it does seem significant that so many
responses were from “technophobes,” as they are labeled; those who aren’t so merrily
jumping on board the information superhighway. It suggests that there appears to be a
substantial amount of caution among the public regarding where all of this innovation is
headed. Indeed, many echo what Kaczynski would argue about these types of
innovations: that they strip the individual of even more autonomy than is necessary by
“allowing” us to rely on them in our daily lives.. As such, they do more harm than good.
One response is offered here:
Computer technology may be making people richer and life faster, but I’m
not sure it’s making us smarter. Is it smart to become more alienated from one
another, to exchange human relationships for frenetic speed and isolation?
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Keep this up and psychiatrists will reap untold profits (Letters, 1997, p. 20).

Obviously, this individual is not prepared to risk the loss of one precious commodity for
the acquisition of another: namely, sacrificing human relationships and “smarts,” for
greater alienation and more speed in technology. Others weren’t so critical of the
perceived progress, stating that these innovations were improvements, and we as a society
ought to be ready to jump on the technological bandwagon (Letters, 1997). By in large,
however, responses to the special edition on technology were more characteristic of a
“technophobic” position. The following passages serves to illustrate this:
I don’t have to fake having a rotary phone; I have one. The best
part is when people who are completely familiar with computers come
over and have to ask for help using the phone. I love it. (pp. 27-28)

The “plight of the technophobes” is in response to technological development
within modern-day society. Wright (1995) discusses the efforts of evolutionary
psychologists to examine the mismatch between our genetic makeup as a species and the
modem world. The hope is to locate the source of discontent resting within many
individuals. The timing of his piece leads to a reference to the Unabomber (Kaczynski had
not been identified as the mail bomber at this point), and Wright mentions that: “There’s a
little bit of the Unabomber in most of us. We may not share his approach to airing a
grievance, but the grievance itself feels familiar” (p. 50). The argument Kaczynski sets
forth and evolutionary psychologists are attempting to analyze is that modem society
requires individuals to live under conditions that are drastically different from those by
which the human race evolved (Wright, 1995). While some are content to reside in
modern-day society, others acknowledge the depression that plagues so many as a moral
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stand, “a protest against a world we do not understand.” (Letters, 1995, p. 18).
In other areas of society, advances in the field of genetics signal precisely the kind
of trend Kaczynski warns his readers about. Thompson (1993) reports on Cynthia
Cutshall and Ashanthi Desilva, two children afflicted with Severe Combined
Immunodeficiency (SCID), the result of being bom with a broken gene that devastated
their immune systems. The two young girls were the first to receive human gene therapy,
a process where defective genes in the girls’ white blood cells were replaced with normal
genes.
Toufexis (1993) reveals the ethical dilemma that the National Institute of Health
was confronted with after treating children who were short in height with a synthetic
version of human growth hormone (HGH). The question was: “Should children who are
healthy be given a drug made simply to change their looks?” (p. 49). Some readers of the
article were appalled by the National Institute of Health’s experiment on healthy children,
citing moral qualms with the issue (Letters, 1993d).
Finally, Elmer-Dewitt (1993) discusses the possibility that technology may have
gone too far when researchers successfully duplicated, or cloned, a human embryo. For
the first time, manipulated cells came “not from plants or pigs or rabbits or cows, but from
human beings.” (p. 65). The issue spawned both positive and negative reactions. While
some felt technology had in fact gone too far in interfering with nature, others believed
this was an accomplishment, not a setback in medical history (Letters, 1993f). One reason
for this is the potential that exists in preventing and curing diseases.
Robert Pirsig’s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (1974) and Theodore
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Kaczynski’s Manifesto (1995) were not created in a vacuum. There were real political,
social, economic, and scientific events surrounding them. Technology received significant
attention during both the 1970s and 1990s, and this attention focused on different ways
that technology was influencing its respective time period. What must now be undertaken
is a theoretical discussion of the method to be used in analyzing the ways Robert Pirsig
and Theodore Kaczynski discuss technology with respect to society.
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CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

ThfiidsagotBh
Some value terms take on special meaning. When
people use them to represent multiple values they
become ‘ideographs’. Thus, the word frontier, for
example, becomes an ideograph. (Sillars, 1991, p. 129)

Rokeach (1968) characterizes the term value as “an enduring belief that a specific
mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to alternate
modes of conduct or end-state of existence” (p. 160). Values should be distinguished
from more specific statements, called beliefs. Whereas “life,” “liberty,” and “the pursuit of
happiness” are values, “abortion is murder” is a belief (Sillars, 1994). Rokeach (1979)
also notes that values can be organized in an effort to establish and reflect priorities.
Where one sub-culture in American society might value individual freedom over collective
welfare, another may value collective welfare over individual freedom.
Values are not things we can point to directly in the material world. As McGee
(1980) notes: “No one has ever seen an ‘equality’ strutting up the driveway, so if
‘equality’ exists at all, it has meaning through its specific applications” (p. 10). Values
represent categories for thought and action that we create, usually in trying to inspire
others toward higher goals or to steer them away from what we think they should not be
thinking or doing. Not left unnoticed here is the fact that values are abstract, and by
nature ambiguous and malleable within the societies in which they operate.
Much like the concept of frontier, freedom is also a value. It is this particular
concept that is a focus of my analysis. Both Pirsig and Kaczynski employ the concept of
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freedom throughout their discussion of technology and society, though they do this in
different ways. Important here is that freedom is examined with respect to technology and
society, as this is how Pirsig and Kaczynski generally treat it. Therefore, a broad
discussion of freedom will be cast aside for a discussion of freedom more specifically
geared toward technology and society. In other words, questions such as: How does
living in modern (technological) society affect individual freedom? will be explored with
respect to both authors. In order to effectively examine the ways each incorporates
freedom into their work, I will utilize Michael Calvin McGee’s (1980) concept of the
“ideograph.”
McGee presented the ideograph to the field of Rhetorical Criticism in an attempt
to create a link betweenTrheforic and ideology. I define ideology loosely as the integrated
assertions, theories, and [core] values o f a given society. These elements operate to
invoke what is right, wrong, and what ought to be within the given society. Early in his
piece, McGee presents the following assertion:
Human beings in collectivity behave and think differently than human beings in
isolation. The collectivity is said to have a “mind o f its own” distinct from the
individual...When one appears to “think” and “behave” collectively, therefore,
one has been tricked...into accepting the brute existence of...“public mind”
(p. 2)

McGee proceeds into a discussion of the distinction between symbolists and materialists
(specifically, “Marxians”). He argues that symbolists generally prefer to say that this
“trick” is a sort of “transcendence,” a voluntary agreement to accept and engage a myth.
Materialists, on the other hand, claim that the trick is essentially a lie, “a self-perpetuating
system of beliefs and interpretations foisted on all members of the community by the ruling
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class” (p. 2). McGee states that, fundamentally, these two groups pursue two different
studies:
The Marxian asks how the “givens” o f a human environment impinge on the
development o f political consciousness; the symbolist asks how the human
symbol-using, reality-creating potential impinges on material reality, ordering
it normatively, “mythically.” (p. 3)

While materialists neglect language studies and fail to adequately explain socially
constructed realities, symbolists neglect the material environment and fail to adequately
explain the impact of material phenomena on the construction of social reality. For
McGee, ideology in general and the ideograph specifically is how gaps between the two
groups can be bridged. The preceding discussion on symbolism and materialism functions
to do two things: 1) ground McGee’s work, isolating some of his motivation for
developing the concept of the ideograph, and 2) provide an initial, broadly-based definition
of the ideograph, which can be characterized as a concentration o f meaning that has
material as well as symbolic implications.
McGee suggests that ideology in practice is “a political language, preserved in
rhetorical documents, with the capacity to dictate decision and control public belief and
behavior” (p. 5). He continues in stating that the language which creates ideology is
characterized by “slogans,” a vocabulary of ideographs. An analysis of these ideographs,
McGee believes, reveals the many structures of public motives. I conceptualize the term
“political” in its broadest sense. That is, while an ideograph may reveal the language
structure behind an attempt to control public belief, and may be political in a broad sense,
it may not necessarily be directly linked to politics as we normally associate the term. In
other words, while “politics” always presupposes being “political,” the reverse is not the
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case as I argue it. The example offreedom as Pirsig discusses it serves to illustrate this.
He attempts to shape human behavior and belief regarding technology, society, and
freedom, but does so without specific mention to any political structure. Kaczynski does
this as well, for the most part, though his argument does include references to
“government” and “industrial society.”
Ideographs are loaded words, existing in real discourse, functioning clearly and
evidently as reflections of consciousness. It is also important to observe that, while it is
not the focus of the present research, ideographs can be visual representations of a
collective consciousness or focal points of an ideology (e.g., the peace symbol, the U.S.
flag, etc.). Ideographs “are not invented by observers. They come to be as a part of the
real lives of the people whose motives they articulate” (p. 7). They are language
imperatives which McGee claims make “pure thought” perhaps impossible, as they are
bound within the culture they help to define. Having discussed McGee’s concept of the
ideograph, I will now turn to some of the ways ideographs have been examined in
research.
Ideographic analyses have been conducted on a wide range of issues and topics.
Edwards and Winkler (1997) examine visual ideographs taking the form of print cartoons
and the “Iwo Jima image.” Moore (1988) argues that the advantage of McGee’s approach
is that “it allows the critic to identify specific language usages that reflect political
commitments and orientations in real discourse” (p. 81). In a later piece (1997), Moore
discusses the environmental debate over tobacco and smoking, and how the cigarette
becomes, through its constant portrayal, a “representational ideograph.” Martin (1983)
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addresses the maimer in which Jimmy Carter was able to construe an image of himself as
“mirroring” the 19th century definition of “the best men” in light of Richard Nixon’s
Watergate troubles. This definition was a compilation of an ideographic cluster which
included “good moral character,” “competency,” and “intelligence.” Carter attempted to
emulate such ideographs. He did so by opposing himself against Nixon, whom he claimed
was, to borrow from Burke (1950), the “antithesis” of these terms.
Lucaites and Condit (1990; 1993) are well-recognized for their work in charting
the ways in which “equality” as an ideograph was invested with divergent content
(integrationist or separatist). Lucaites and Condit give more weight to the potential for
public influence over an ideograph’s meaning, and as such perhaps shed the ideograph in
more of an “optimistic light” than McGee, who stresses the “potentially coercive
dimensions of ideographic usage” (see Cloud’s 1998 discussion of Lucaites and Condit’s
work on the ideograph “equality”). McGee, as mentioned, argues that it is possible
ideographs may make “pure thought” impossible because of their very nature. The added
spin Lucaites and Condit place on the ideograph is a helpful one, particularly for analyses
such as my own, where the issue is not necessarily one involving a particular group
(political or not) asserting power or influence over another, but rather individuals writing
from their own perspectives in hopes of generating discussion and stimulating change.
Readers of their work are not likely in a position of subservience, but are instead merely
potential agents of change and action.
Finally, Cloud (1998) examines the ideograph “family values” as it was deployed
by republicans and democrats during the 1992 presidential election campaign. Dan
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Quayle’s speech on the alleged decline of family values in the midst of the urban riots in
Los Angeles and through television series’ such as Murphy Brown is said to have been
one of the instigators of this ideograph’s deployment. Cloud reveals that talk centering
around family values served to scapegoat Black men and poor Americans for social
problems (not to mention being disastrous for poor, Black men and women). That is, it
was these particular groups of Americans that were not meeting their responsibilities as
parents, according to this type of “talk.” Any combination of being Black, female, and
poor served to magnify the blame that was placed on these individuals.
While much of the research utilizing ideographic analysis as method has been
centered around both the political in general and politics specifically, the present endeavor
seeks to employ this method in a “non-political” arena, if you will. In this regard, it seeks
to extend McGee’s discussion of the ideograph by examining the ways Robert Pirsig and
Ted Kaczynski employ the value concept freedom without utilizing or incorporating
specific political platforms (for the most part, as discussed). It also seeks to extend
McGee’s work by analyzing one text that explicitly discusses freedom and one that does
so at a more implicit and “definition-by-association” level. The Manifesto makes explicit,
direct references to freedom (and autonomy). Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
Maintenance, however, makes no such references. Instead, the 360-plus page book
discusses terms such as peace-of-mind and control as related to technology and society.
What I argue is that freedom is a concept that appears in the work of both
Kaczynski and Pirsig. It does so, as mentioned, at different levels. I will primarily focus
my attention inward at the texts, rather than outward at historical conceptualizations of
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freedom. This will be done for two reasons. First, I am examining freedom with respect
to technology. This is an important point, for to examine the concept in its complete and
broad sense would not only be an overwhelming task, but would overshoot my mark for
the purposes of this research. Discussion of freedom with respect to technology and
society has been far less prolific than an overall discussion of freedom (e.g., with respect
to political systems of thought). Second, my primary purpose is to examine how Pirsig
and Kaczynski discuss freedom, and looking directly at the ways each invokes the concept
requires devoting much of my attention inward at the texts. Certainly, references and
comparisons will be drawn against outside conceptualizations of freedom, but emphasis
will be placed on the way each discusses the term, and the comparisons between the two.
Because freedom is discussed at different levels by both authors, it is necessary to
justify such an analysis. Cheney and Tompkins (1988) examine the many
conceptualizations and levels of the concept text, and in comparing the empirical sciences
highly efficient statistical means for analyzing text versus more literary or rhetorical ones,
come up with a potential “rival” to empiricism. By utilizing Kenneth Burke’s (1964)
theory of indexing, the critic can forge one “route toward validity and reliability in
interpretation” (p. 464).
Burke’s indexing method entails a series of propositions, one of which states that
“the specific associations or relationships between terms of a text are of three general
types: equations, implications, and transformations” (Cheney & Tompkins, 1988).
Equations deal mostly with direct linkages or lines of opposition (the example provided is
“War is evil”). Implications involve spin-offs of a term (e.g., how “order” might stem
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from “hierarchy” or “control”). Transformations reveal the “from what,” “through what,”
and “to what” developments such as a syllogistic progression or a “yesterday-todaytomorrow” sequence (p. 466). It is at this level that inferences are more readily made and
apparent. While both the Manifesto and Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance
employ each of these associations with respect to freedom, the former more frequently
utilizes equations and implications, whereas the latter adheres more to transformations,
leaving the critic to draw inferences about how freedom enters into a particular mini
discussion within the text. Additionally, Cheney and Tompkins note Burke’s suggestion
for the critic to “note operational synonyms of a word, terms that are synonymous to it in
the text under consideration” (Cheney & Tompkins, p. 467). This is particularly relevant
to an analysis of freedom in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, though it also
comes into play with the Manifesto (e.g., the term “autonomy”). In the former, the term
freedom is virtually absent from the entire text, and I will argue that operational synonyms
for it do exist. Moreover, I argue that Pirsig’s rather tacit usage of the concept does not
attenuate its significance in any way.
McGee’s (1980) concept of the ideograph will be utilized in examining the value of
freedom as it appears, either explicitly or implicitly, in the Manifesto and Zen and the Art
of Motorcycle Maintenance. Building on Cloud’s (1998) and other prior research, I will
denote the concept of freedom in carats (<freedom>) during the ideographic analysis
section, since <freedom> is the ideograph to be examined. Keeping in mind Cheney &
Tompkin’s (1988) discussion of Burke (1964) will allow for a more valid and reliable
interpretation of the concept as it appears in both texts. I will now address an additional
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method to be utilized in my analysis -- that of the implicated body.

The Implicated Body
Why is the body such an intense focus o f attention in
the academy today?....Is one reason so many o f us are
energetically studying the body precisely that we are
undergoing fundamental changes in how our bodies are
organized and experienced? (Martin, 1992, p. 543)

In chapter one I discussed how Pirsig and Kaczynski assess the problem of
technology and society in similar and different ways, and how they develop means for
coping with this problem that are radically different from one another. I also discussed
how the styles and structures of the two texts were quite different, with Pirsig’s being
more poetic and multi-themed, and Kaczynski’s being more scientific and argumentative.
Both authors also implicate the body differently in their discussions of technology and
society. Pirsig implicates the body as a means for reconciling technology with society.
That is, if one can engage both the physical and mental aspects of one’s own body, and
strive for Quality in one’s work, hobbies....etc., then real progress can be made, according
to Pirsig. Emphasizing both the physical and the mental makes sense when one considers
that Pirsig seeks to adopt a “Zen-like” approach to reconciling technology with society. If
the individual is to achieve a sense of oneness with their work, hobbies...etc., this is likely
to be so because a similar sense is achieved at both the physical and mental levels of the
individual body. Kaczynski on the other hand implicates the body primarily as an end,
choosing to inform his reader o f the ways the body will continue to be engaged in modern
society as well as the way it ought to be engaged once a revolution against technology is
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carried out. For example, Kaczynski argues that technology strips the individual of
proper physical engagement with the power process. Only through a more primitive
lifestyle can one attain the type of fulfillment found in directly providing for one’s own
vital needs, such as food, clothing and shelter. Additionally, Kaczynski strongly implicates
the body by arguing that at the rate technological/modern-day society is “progressing,”
individuals will become more and more isolated from their physical bodies by relying on
ever-increasing [indirect] means for fulfilling vital needs. Additionally, he asserts that the
time will come where we as individuals will progressively lose control of our own bodies,
even at the very fundamental level of biological /genetic make-up. Thus, for Kaczynski,
technology becomes part of and contributes to the artificial or inauthentic experience for
human beings. Kaczynski instantiates this idea by citing developments in genetic
engineering and [human] biological research. He argues that such developments are
creating this trend.
It becomes apparent through the work of Pirsig and Kaczynski that an analysis of
the ways the body gets discussed in their work is both critical and central to an analysis of
how these two authors reconcile technology with society. For both, the arguments that
get developed center around the body, sometimes dealing explicitly with its implications
and other times hovering around them, though seemingly never drifting more than an
arm’s length from the focal point that is the body.14 What is perhaps most appealing about
examining these particular texts is the way in which the body is implicated in arriving at
completely different means for coping with technology vis-a-vis society. As such, by
conducting what I might call a “body-centered analysis,” a more thorough understanding

45

of the ways technology gets discussed with respect to society (through Pirsig and
Kaczynski, anyway) is attainable.
Emily Martin (1992; 1994) suggests that in American society today the body is
being experienced in dramatically different ways from the era of “Fordist mass
production.” She characterizes the Fordist mass production system (perhaps most
identified by the public through the image of the assembly line) as one which had as its
goal efficiency, and utilized a production method geared to manufacturing large quantities
of standardized products assembled with standardized components. Consequently,
“Fordism” referred to the collective effort to create a new type of worker and a new type
of man, one who could withstand the rigorous physical demands associated with this type
of “mass-production” work. This particular worker would have to be in good health and
good physical shape (1992).
Currently, our bodies are suited more for what Martin terms an era of “flexible
accumulation.” She states: “We are seeing not the end of the body, but rather the end of
one kind of body and the beginning of another kind of body” (1992, p. 544). In other
words, our bodies are not being utilized (and subsequently, experienced) as much for
laborious purposes as they used to be, but are instead experiencing an intensification of the
processes of deskilling and reskilling, particularly in the workplace. With this, the mental
component of the body is drawing more and more weight than its counterpart, the
physical. In this regard, individuals are being drawn further away from their physical
selves, so-to-speak.
Susan Faludi (1999) creates similar discussion in her recent work, but with special
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emphasis given to experiences held by males and the problems they encounter in trying to
uphold socially constructed images of masculinity. For example, young men grow up with
fathers who participated in the type of “Fordist” era Martin (1992) speaks of, or who
participated in World War II. Today, men are too often deprived of the kinds of
“opportunities,” if you will, to experience such masculinity. Because of societal,
organizational, and technological development (these three overlap, obviously), men are
left with conflicting notions of what it means to be masculine compared with the
experiences of prior generations, Faludi argues. She claims that if males (and females) can
get past these entrenched notions of what it means to be masculine, both sexes can begin
to make progress toward a more liberating society at the level of gender.15 Kaczynski, for
example, probably would not cite the arguments laid out by Martin and Faludi as the
primary motivation for his own theorizing, but would certainly have to acknowledge these
issues as contributors to the problems that he argues technology poses for society.16
While the body is central to both Pirsig’s and Kaczynski’s discussion of technology
and society, it gets implicated in different ways. I will examine the ways both writers
implicate the body in their respective works, and the style and structure of each text will
prove to influence how the body is invoked. Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance
is multi-themed and more poetic than the Manifesto, which is more argumentative and
scientifically grounded. As such, Pirsig applies a greater use of metaphor in discussing the
body when he moves from one theme of the book to another. For the most part, these
metaphors exist in the more poetic, narrative theme of the author’s cross-country
motorcycle trip with his son. They serve to emphasize the points he makes about
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technology and society in the intellectual framework he develops.17
If one text were to more strongly invoke the notion of “the implicated body,” it
would probably be the Manifesto. Kaczynski’s work is generally lacking in colorful
metaphor and poetic style. Instead, his more argumentative and scientific approach results
in a discussion of the body as it will likely be implicated in a society which continues along
its present course of technological development. An additional result is a discussion of the
way the body ought to be engaged and why Kaczynski believes a revolution against
modem industrial society is necessary to arrive at this. In both cases, the body is central
to Kaczynski’s primary argument. In the following brief chapter I will review what has
been covered thus far and provide an overview of the remaining sections of the thesis.
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CHAPTER 5: REVIEW AND PREVIEW

Thus far, I have provided a rationale for why I feel it is important to examine the
phenomenon of technology and its impact on society. I’ve also rationalized why it is that
Robert Pirsig’s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance and Ted Kaczynski’s
Manifesto are worthy texts for examination in this respect. I have provided brief
overviews of the two texts, along with a discussion of the stylistic and structural
similarities and differences between both, and the implications of this. This led to a
discussion of the contexts in which these two texts were created. Specifically, I examined
American cultural climate of the 1970s and the 1990s, focusing on the beginning and
middle parts of the respective decades, when these texts were produced.
I proceeded into a discussion of the theoretical components to be employed in my
analysis. First to be discussed was the ideograph, introduced by Michael Calvin McGee in
1980. The concept of <freedom> will be analyzed as an ideograph through both texts,
appearing either explicitly or at a more implicit level (e.g., through Pirsig). Finally, I
propose to examine what I call the “implicated body” as it gets invoked by Pirsig and
Kaczynski. Specifically, I will be looking at Pirsig’s more metaphorical discussion of the
body versus Kaczynski’s more scientific, argumentative approach and the levels at which
they implicate the body as they argue for how we as a society ought to cope with
technology.
In the following sections of this thesis, I will analyze both artifacts, beginning with
the ideographic analysis of the ways Pirsig and Kaczynski discuss the concept <freedom>
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in their respective works. I will also discuss the implications this part of my analysis has
for the examination of the phenomenon of technology vis-a-vis society. I will follow this
with the analysis of the “implicated body” as both texts invoke it. This section will also be
concluded with a discussion of its implications. Both sections will be analyzed at a
“micro-level.” That is, I will examine the two texts in some instances at the level of
individual words (and word choice). Finally, I will conclude the Thesis by moving
outward to a more macro-level, discussing the overall implications this research has on the
issue of technology with respect to society (i.e., considering technology as a social
institution).
In setting up the forthcoming analysis, it may prove helpful for my reader to keep
the following diagram in mind:
Step 1
P irsig : subject object m erging
through curing, the striving tor
Q uality. and the "body"

K aczynski: Freedom from
technology and modern day society

Can Lead To....
---------------- >

---------------- >

Step 2
■Freedom '- in a technological /
m odern society (e.g.. “control."
“ peace o f m ind." “ security")

Proper engagem ent o f v\ ith the
"body" a n d autonom y • freedom -'

For Pirsig, step one is feasible within modem day society, as long as the individual “re
evaluates” the mindset which advocates a clear distinction between subjects and objects,
and instead opts for an elimination of this form of dualistic thinking by advocating
“caring,” striving for Quality, and re-engaging the body with the mind (in one’s work,
hobbies, etc.). Kaczynski on the other hand argues that we must break free from
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technology and the current social structure in order to arrive at proper engagement of our
bodies and sufficient levels of freedom. For both authors, if step one is not achieved, the
consequences will be a continued lack o f or potential decline in what is proposed in step
two.
The preceding diagram is meant to preview and illustrate the arguments I will be
presenting in the forthcoming analysis. First, that both Pirsig and Kaczynski rely heavily
on notions of the body and freedom in their discussion of the phenomenon of technology.
Second, that they do so in comparable and contrasting ways. And third, that the different
ways they invoke these notions affects how they get invoked throughout each of their
texts. I will now turn to an ideographic analysis of the the concept <freedom> as I argue
it appears in both texts.
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CHAPTER 6: THE IDEOGRAPH <FREEDOM>

Before any discussion of how Pirsig and Kaczynski invoke the concept of
<freedom> in their respective works can occur, it is necessary to at least preface this by
addressing the ways technology and <freedom> are thought to or expected to go together
in modem society. This is done in order to provide a basis on which to evaluate the
arguments set forth by Pirsig and Kaczynski, as many of their “recommendations” are
responses to perceived societal needs. First, <freedom> is not conceptualized here in its
more general sense, but rather with respect to technology. Thus, the types of questions
people seek to answer regarding technology and <freedom> are: What does technology
mean for my individual freedom? or How does technology affect freedom at the societal
level and/or the individual level? It may be that in modem Western culture the line
separating “freedom in a general sense” from “<freedom> with respect to technology” is
becoming increasingly blurred, as technology is now so interwoven into our daily lives that
any such distinction is near impossible. Regardless, we as a society all have expectations,
or hopes, for what we believe technology ought to accomplish for our <ffeedom>. These
expectations and hopes may or may not be met; this is an issue Pirsig and Kaczynski
explore and evaluate in their works.
In attempting to characterize folk or lay wisdom on the subject of technology, it
can plausibly be argued that there are certain commonalities that exist when we as a
society consider what technology ought to accomplish for us (and through us, since we
are its “pioneers”). For example, we expect technology to contribute to more jobs, larger
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quantities of food and consumer goods, and adequate shelter with proper heating and
cooling, to name a few core benefits. Wright (1995) echoes this sentiment in an article
which also illuminates the growing viewpoint that technology may be producing an
increasingly different world from the one in which we evolved. One may pose the
question: Where does <freedom> fit into this?
First, <ffeedom> fits in at the level of peace o f mind. That is, individuals who
occupy a job, have enough food and possess adequate housing, for example, owe this at
least in part to technological innovation. Having these needs met provides the individual
with peace of mind, and leaves him/her free to pursue other avenues of interest that
contribute to what is perceived to be a fulfilling lifestyle. Examples of these might include
taking up hobbies, spending more time with one’s family, and/or philanthropy, to name a
few. Second, <ffeedom> occurs at the level of options. Technology contributes in
providing the consumer, for example, with multiple options in the world of consumer
products. Thus, the individual exhibits a more magnified freedom of choice in deciding
which variety of apple to eat, which brand of toothpaste to use, which style of sunglasses
to wear, which type of living quarters to reside in, etc. Individuals in modem American
society are for the most part not restricted to only one “brand” of a given product.18 The
<freedom> existent in having options can even be felt in the realm of employment. Many
individuals have a legitimate choice in deciding what type of job to occupy, where to
occupy it and with whom to work. Again, technology, and technological development,
contribute to this.
Certainly I am guilty here of simplifying matters and providing broad
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generalizations. Realistically, there are many subleties at work in the interplay of
technology, society, and <freedom>. For example, certain technological innovations are
going to be percieved to do more or less for human <ffeedom> than others. It would be
unfair and less than critical to assume otherwise. Accessibility also becomes an issue. A
significant number of people do not have access to the perceived “fruits of technology.”
For example, the homeless in our society likely do not enjoy the kind of peace of mind that
many middle-class citizens do when it comes to neccessities like food, clothing and shelter.
Along with these issues one must also consider the influence of such forces as the media
and government regulation/interference. How much do these institutions infringe upon (or
extend) the type of individual <freedom> that owes itself in large part to technology?
How free are we in a society where the development of the telecommunications industry is
resulting in an increasing number of ways to monitor human behavior?19 Two
philosophers I’ve discussed previously, Ellul (1964) and Marcuse (1968), probe deeply
into issues such as these.
The subleties and questions discussed here are certainly critical ones that require
ongoing examination. Their mentioning is meant, though, to illustrate that I am in fact
making generalizations about technology’s influence on individual <ffeedom>. That is to
say, we as members of society have rather general and uniform hopes and expectations for
what technology ought to do for us and our <freedom>. The distinction between what the
individual believes technology ought to do, and what it actually does, is an important one
for my reader to keep in mind. Discussing ways that technology can contribute to peace
of mind and freedom of choice, for example, likely coincides with what we as a society
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believe it ought to do. The inaccessibility of technology’s perceived benefits to everyone,
such as the homeless, in all likelihood does not coincide with what we as a society believe
it ought to do. Having said this, I will now turn to a discussion of what Pirsig and
Kaczynski argue technology does for individual <freedom>, and how they feel this should
or should not be altered.

Kaczvnski and <Freedom>
People do not consciously and rationally choose
the form o f their society. Societies develop through
processes o f social evolution that are not under
rational human control. (Kaczynski, p. 19)

One of the central ways in which Kaczynski assesses technology is by appealing to
the concept <freedom>. It is argued here that <ffeedom> is a primary component to
Kaczynski’s discussion of technology, but also that his argument is broken up into a series
of “mini-arguments.” This should come as no surprise since the Manifesto itself is laid out
in an argumentative, scientific manner, as compared to Pirsig’s Zen and the Art of
Motorcycle Maintenance, which is more poetic in style. I argue that Kaczynski’s
development of the <freedom> concept can be divided into five mini-arguments, which I
categorize as: 1) setting the stage, 2) autonomy as necessity, 3) the imposition of change,
4) purposelessness and “the leash”, and 5) potential “ends” for the human race. It is
important to keep in mind that <freedom> is what drives each of these arguments (as I
propose), and although Kaczynski actually uses the term freedom, he also incorporates the
term autonomy into his argument.
Setting the stage
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In this particular “argument,” Kazcynski attempts to rationalize why it is that he
advocates the taking of such extreme measures in responding to industrial-technological
society. In the introduction of the Manifesto Kaczynski states, “There is no way of
reforming or modifying the system so as to prevent it from depriving people of dignity and
autonomy” (p. 1). He goes on to mention that his revolution is just that —a revolution.
It’s objective will not be to overthrow the political structure of modem society
specifically, but rather the economic and technological structures of society. At the outset
the reader is forced to recognize Kaczynski’s appeal to the notion of <freedom> when he
implements the term autonomy. The term freedom appears in a later passage: “...any
attempts at reform would be too timid to be effective...permanent changes in favor of
freedom could be brought about only by...revolutionaries...” (p. 20).20 Kaczynski
advocates revolution over reform, but he does so by attaching <freedom> to that
argument. It is implied that a revolution is necessary if the reader values <ffeedom>, and
the only way we as a society will be able to procure it is by revolting against technology.
Essentially, the reader is forced into a comer, with little or no alternative to the issue if
s/he values <freedom>.
Kaczynski continues to paint the picture of technology suppressing freedom in an
ensuing passage, and he does so a bit more emphatically: “...technological progress
marches in only one direction; it can never be reversed...the system can move in only one
direction, toward greater technologization. Technology repeatedly forces freedom to take
a step back —short of the overthrow of the whole technological system” (p. 25). Again
the reader is forced to recognize Kaczynski’s claim that technology comes at a cost ~
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human <freedom>. Additionally, he asserts that this force cannot be halted or reformed,
for technology “marches in only one direction.” Kaczynski’s argument that there are only
two options in this matter - technology or <freedom>- becomes clearer here.
Thus far, Kaczynski’s argument in what I term “setting the stage” has consisted of
broad, sweeping claims without a lot of support behind them. He attempts to reconcile
this in a passage suggesting that the human race has had such a difficult time solving less
abstract problems (Kaczynski’s example is of environmental degradation) that it certainly
would be unable to reconcile technology with <ffeedom>. He suggests that technology
presents clear-cut material advantages, whereas freedom is an abstraction that means
different things to different people. The advocacy of revolution over reform is emphasized
again, but this time the argument takes a different form. It is not merely that technology
as a force suppresses <freedom>, but that the human race simply would not be able to
manage any kind of reconciliation of <freedom> with technology. The reasoning given
behind this is that the concept of <freedom> is an abstract one that means different things
to different people. Despite its “abstract” nature, Kaczynski arrives at what he believes to
be a suitable definition of the term.
<Freedom> according to Kaczynski means “...the opportunity to go through the
power process, with real goals [sic] not the artificial goals of surrogate activities, and
without interference, manipulation or supervision from anyone, especially from any large
organization” (p. 17). Additionally, it entails being in control of the vital issues of one’s
life, either as an individual or potentially as a member of a small group. These vital issues
include the necessities of food, clothing and shelter. <Freedom> also implies being able to
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defend oneself against any threats that may exist in one’s environment.
Kaczynski’s definition of <ffeedom> clearly falls in line with what he is arguing
and advocating: that individuals are less than free in modem, technological society, and
that they must break “free” from that society in order to acquire <freedom>. This
definition helps to establish later arguments that in modem society, individual <ffeedom>
is constantly being suppressed in order to meet the needs of the system. Because of this,
Kaczynski argues, frustration and purposelessness (among other things) are rampant. The
claim is also made that individuals who simply say they are free may not really be free, as
notions of <freedom> in modem society are often governed more by social convention
than by actual needs. The point is made to connect the reader once more to the
assumption that in modem society, <ffeedom> is ingenuine if perceived at all, and takes a
back seat to technological progress.
The first passages in the Manifesto set the stage for the remainder of Kaczynski’s
argument centering around <freedom>. I will now turn to the discussion of what I call
“autonomy as necessity,” and how <ffeedom> is implicated in this. This theme is derived
from Kaczynski’s frequent discussion and development of the concept “autonomy.”
Autonomy as necessity
Kaczynski believes individuals have a natural need to go through what he calls the
“power process.” This process entails: 1) having a goal, 2) pursuing that goal, and 3)
attaining the goal. Autonomy is the fourth element in the power process and is implicated
at the level of effort, or step two. Kaczynski argues that individuals need to be able to
pursue their goals on their own or as participating members of a small group. He also
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suggests that it is through this process that individuals acquire confidence, self-esteem,
and a sense of power. When one is unable to adequately go through the power process
the consequences are (potentially) boredom, demoralization, low self-esteem, inferiority
feelings, defeatism, depression.21 For Kaczynski, the power process is pivotal in
experiencing a life that is fulfilling. Autonomy is an essential ingredient in this process,
since having “adequate opportunity ” to go through the power process relies in large part
on its presence. Recall that for Kaczynski, power is conceptualized inward at the level of
the individual. That is, he argues that what individuals require most is not the need to
exert power over others, but the need to have sufficient levels of autonomy in engaging
the power process on their own terms and with respect to the issues of their own lives.
In a footnote to the preceding passage, Kaczynski suggests that some of the
symptoms listed are similar to those shown by caged animals. Those who do not engage
the power process properly are, according to Kaczynski, analagous to caged animals. The
point is implied that caged animals arrive at states such as boredom and depression as a
result of being confined to a cage. Here we catch a glimpse of just how important the
concept of <freedom> is to Kaczynski’s argument. It is argued that individuals that do
not engage the power process experience similar symptoms to caged animals that are
confined. For these caged animals, it is all about autonomy. They do not have any
<freedom>. Autonomy is only one element, however, in the power process —albeit a
crucial element.
Kaczynski proposes that most people need at least some degree of autonomy in
pursuing their goals. If this is accomplished, their need for the power process will in all
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likelihood be served. If this is not accomplished, though, and the individual works under
orders from above that do not allow for any autonomous decision making, then his or her
need for the power process will not be served. Kaczynski notes that some individuals
appear to have little or no need for autonomy, and he characterizes these individuals as
being one of three ways: 1) either lacking a drive for power, 2) being satisfied to identify
themselves with a large and powerful organization, or 3) as unthinking, animal types,
satisfied with a purely physical sense of power. The first characterization is left
uncriticized by Kaczynski, but the second is critically implicated within the third.
Kaczynski’s example for those satisfied with a purely physical sense of power is the “good
combat soldier,” yet there are few organizations larger and more powerful than military
branches of the government. While it would be an unsubstantiated argument to claim that
Kaczynski is critical of all types who lack the need for autonomy, it can certainly be
argued that a critical tone is adopted by Kaczynski in discussing these individuals.
Finally, Kaczynski suggests that in modem society, individuals do not satisfy their
biological needs autonomously, but by functioning as parts of an immense social machine.
By “biological” needs, Kaczynski is referring to necessities such as food, water, and even
clothing and shelter. Essentially, he argues that the power process ought to be directed
toward these types of goals, which he calls primary or real goals. We as a society, in
large part, do not satisfy these needs through our own, physical effort, but rather in an
indirect manner.22 For example, food and water are for most people procured by working
a job, earning a paycheck, and purchasing these necessities from vendors or merchants,
without actually providing these for oneself directly. Readers of the Manifesto might ask:

60

What’s wrong with working as a part o f society and procuringfor oneself albeit
indirectly, necessities such as food and water? This is one of the questions Kaczynski
addresses in what follows, and <ffeedom> is a primary component in his discussion.
The imposition of change
Kaczynski believes that working a job and contributing to society in exchange for
being provided necessities like food, clothing, and shelter is anything but a fair exchange,
particularly when one examines more critically the role modem society assumes in one’s
day-to-day life. There are ramifications to be accepted, ones that impact individual
<freedom>. He states: “...modem man has the sense...that change is IMPOSED on him,
whereas the 19th century frontiersman had the sense...that he created change himself, by
his own choice. Thus a pioneer settled on a piece of land of his own choosing and made it
into a farm through his own effort” (p. 10). Kaczynski is arguing that 19th century
frontiersmen had much more <freedom> of choice, and as a result had more control over
their lives. He uses the example of being able to “settle on a piece of land,” but it is clear
that his conceptualization of <freedom> extends far beyond this. <Freedom> would also
be extended to satisfying one’s biological needs autonomously, as was discussed earlier,
and as Kaczynski suggests is not the case for modem man. Modern man is constrained by
society, forced to accept the changes that are imposed on him. By stating that modem
man has “the sense” that change is imposed on him, Kaczynski tunes into a level of
frustration and resentment that he believes people in modem society are experiencing.
A specific example is laid out in the Manifesto which seeks to illustrate this point.
It is the advent of motorized transportation, and Kaczynski prefaces this example by

61

suggesting that technological advances that appear not to threaten freedom often turn out
to be a serious threat to it later on. He chronicles this by considering a walking person’s
former ability to go where s/he pleased and at his or her own pace without being restricted
by traffic lights and regulations. The introduction of motor vehicles appeared to increase
individual <freedom>, since nobody was forced to own one. If an individual did they
could usually get from point A to B more quickly. However, Kaczynski argues that
motorized transportation altered society in such a way as to actually restrict individual
<freedom>. Once motorized vehicles grew to such a large number it became necessary to
regulate their use by instituting registration methods, periodical inspections, and vehicle
insurance requirements. Kaczynski suggests that at this point individuals are now being
constrained by all of these regulations. It is these regulations, or changes brought about
by society (i.e., the system), that restrict individual <freedom>. Moreover, Kaczynski
notes that motorized transportation is no longer an option for most individuals. The
layouts of cities have changed in such a way as to require individuals to own vehicles for
transportation. Essentially, people are forced to accept a technological advance that
began as legitimately optional. Change has been imposed on the modem individual, and it
is human <freedom> that suffers the consequences, Kaczynski argues.
Being forced to comply with change is something felt by many in the workplace, as
well. Skilled workers are frequently either put out of a job by technical advances or
forced to undergo re-training. Kaczynski asserts that this can be a humiliating experience
for some workers, but it is simply taken for granted that individuals must embrace
technical necessity. He believes that if human needs were placed before technical
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necessity the result would be economic turmoil (e.g., greater unemployment). It is at this
point that Kaczynski connects the necessity for accepting change that is initiated by the
system with society’s conceptualization of mental health. He suggests that mental health
is defined largely by how well an individual behaves in accord with the needs of the
system, and how much or little stress results from this. Thus, individuals are expected to
accept change when it is for the good of the system, and are evaluated (mentally) in part
by how well they adapt to these changes and behave thereafter. Kaczynski’s argument
that modem individuals feel change is imposed on them is similar to notions of being on a
leash and feeling a sense of purposelessness, both of which are also connected to the
concept of <freedom>. It is here that I now turn.
Purposelessness and “the leash”

If being forced to accept the change that is imposed on an individual restricts that
individual’s <ffeedom>, it can be expected that this restriction of <freedom> has negative
consequences. I have previously stated that Kaczysnki has already suggested a few of
these consequences, namely feelings of frustration and resentment. One other
consequence that receives more explicit discussion by Kaczynski is the sense of
purposelessness that he feels is prevalent today and warrants attention. This sense of
purposelessness is closely connected to a perception that individuals are restricted by the
proverbial “leash” that is the system, and this leash is somewhat related to earlier
discussion of modem man’s feeling that change is imposed on him.23 Kaczynski maintains
that the problem of purposelessness that exists in modem society cannot be resolved by
simply arriving at a point where society can guarantee everyone’s security (e.g., by
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providing for everyone). This would only bring back the problem of purposelessness. The
real problem, as Kaczynski sees it, is that individuals are framing the issue improperly.
Individuals are dependent on the system for their security instead of having it in their own
hands, and this is where feelings of purposelessness come into play. When individuals
come to realize that society is providing for them these feelings surface. Restricted
<freedom> breeds perceived negative consequences, Kaczynski would argue. These
negative consequences take the form of feelings of purposelessness. The right to bear
arms receives brief attention here, as it is proposed that so many people passionately
advocate it because owning a gun puts the element of personal security in one’s own
hands. Owning a gun essentially translates into greater <ffeedom>. Kaczynski’s tone here
is empathetic and supportive toward these individuals, as it is implied that they are taking
their security into their own hands and acting out against the system.
A sense of purposelessness is again associated with this concept of “the leash”
when Kaczynski asserts that many individuals are not in a position to pursue their goals
autonomously. For example, workers are more often than not someone else’s employee,
and have to perform the necessary functions associated with their job by doing what they
are told to do in the way they are told to do it. Those who are in business for themselves,
and would appear to have a great amount of autonomy/<freedom>, often complain that
their hands are tied by government regulations.
It is Kaczynski’s belief that the reason so many individuals possess feelings of
purposelessness is because they are not engaging the power process properly; and the
reason the power process is not being engaged properly is because their exists a deficiency
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of both real goals and autonomy in pursuing these goals:
Our lives depend on decisions made by other people; we have no control over
these decisions and usually we do not even know the people who make
them...our lives depend on whether safety standards at a nuclear power plant
are properly maintained...The individual’s search for security is therefore
frustrated, which leads to a sense o f purposelessness, (p. 12)

<freedom> is heavily connected with security in this passage. Kaczynski implies that
individuals may be able to possess a gun, but this will not amount to complete security by
any means. There exist other forces at work which have the potential to infringe upon
individual <freedom> at very significant levels. These forces inevitably leave the
individual feeling helpless; as if, as Kaczynski claims, “we have no control” over certain
issues.
In a later passage Kaczynski reasons that, while there is no law that says we must
go to work everyday and follow orders given by an employer, in practice it can really be
no other way. Realistically, there is room in the economy for only a small number of
private business owners, and there can only be so many bosses. The structure of society
demands that the majority of us work as someone else’s employee. Again, Kaczynski
draws a negative picture of the consequences of being on the leash that has at its other end
modem society.
Modem society is in certain respects extremely permissive, according to the
Manifesto. In matters that do not effect the functioning of the system, we as members of
society possess complete autonomy. The example given is that we can believe in any
religion we like, as long as it does not encourage behavior that threatens the system. We
can engage in sexual behaviors with whomever we please, as long as we practice “safe
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sex.” In other words, Kaczynski argues, we have autonomy in all unimportant matters,
but the system regulates our behavior increasingly in those matters that can be
characterized as “important”. A distinction between two sides of the issue of autonomy is
established by Kaczynski. We as members of society possess autonomy in unimportant
matters, and do not possess it in those matters that are deemed important by the system.
Kaczynski makes an argument about the nature of the system that is similar to an
earlier one set forth about human needs being overridden by technical necessity. He
suggests that the system must regulate human behavior in order to function efficiently.
Workers must do what they are told, otherwise production would be thrown into chaos.
He asserts: “A technological society cannot be broken down into small, autonomous
communities, because production depends on the cooperation of very large numbers of
people and machines” (p. 21). The reader of the Manifesto is informed that there is simply
no other alternative for the system. Autonomy, or <freedom>, must be sacrificed to it.
In a rare literary move by Kaczynski in the Manifesto, he draws an analogy of the
human race with technology to a drank with a barrell of wine. The drunk argues that wine
isn’t detrimental if used in moderation, and that one little drink won’t hurt. Kaczynski
points out that the drunk will certainly consume too much wine, and the link between the
drank and the human race corresponds to the link between a barrel of wine and
technology. It is implied that we as a race will have more difficulty getting off the leash
that is modem society/the system/technology the more we endulge it. Perhaps the
proposal is that we will squander our own <ffeedom> to the point that it becomes
nonexistent. This provides a segway to Kaczynski’s proposal of the potential ends that
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await the human race, and how <freedom> is implicated.
Potential “ends” for the human race
Of the two potential ends Kaczynski proposes for technology and society, the first
is what he is trying to counter and avoid. He begins this discussion (or at least, this
discussion as I categorize it) by declaring that if individuals feel government interference in
day-to-day life is excessive now, the future holds a much more disturbing prospect —one
that entails government regulation of the genetic constitution of their children. Kaczynski
argues that this course of action will inevitably lead to the genetic engineering of human
beings. Advances in this field will initially and by themselves appear to be beneficial to the
human race. For example, through genetic engineering certain diseases will be able to be
accounted for, treated, and perhaps even cured.24 Such advances, though, will become
part of an authority-lead (perhaps governmental) process of rapid social evolution.
Essentially, the sphere of individual <freedom> will continually decrease in size.25
Kaczynski suggests that technology would eventually, within this scenario, achieve near
complete control over human behavior.
Should society adhere to the arguments advocated by Kaczynski, the industrialtechnological system will meet its demise. It is argued that regardless of the type of
society that exists after such a demise, individuals will certainly have to live close to
nature. The absence of advanced technology mandates such a lifestyle, as there is virtually
no other way for people to live. Individuals will, like their primitive ancestors, procure
food by being peasants, herdsmen, fishermen and/or hunters. It is through this lifestyle,
where real goals are the only goals, that individuals will properly engage the power
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process. <Freedom> and feelings of purpose and fulfillment will once again predominate,
Kaczynski believes. Additionally, autonomy will be better served at the local level, where
local communities will be able to flourish without the fear of governmental control.26
Once again, Kaczynski depicts issues regarding <freedom> by suggesting only two
potential “ends” for the human race. One involves the continued development of
technology, leading to eventual control over human behavior. The other scenario requires
individuals to break free from society, abolishing its industrial-technological structure, and
returning to more primitive ways. Kaczynski argues it is here that the power process can
be properly experienced and <freedom> can resurface to achieve sufficient levels for the
individual.
I have addressed the Manifesto’s utilization of the concept <freedom> in its
discussion of technology. Kaczynski’s argumentative and scientific approach allows for a
categorization of how <freedom> is discussed. I argue that Kaczynski discusses the
concept with respect to five mini-arguments or sections: 1) setting the stage, 2) autonomy
as necessity, 3) the imposition of change, 4) purposelessness and “the leash,” and 5)
possible “ends” for the human race. Summarizing Kaczynksi’s key arguments reveals that:
o

Individuals have a natural need to experience the power process, and one of the
key components to this process is autonomy or <ffeedom>.

o

In modem society, sufficient levels of <ffeedom> are impossible to achieve (e.g.,
individuals feeling that change is imposed on them), and the result of this is
increased feelings of frustration, purposelessness, anger, etc.

o

Individuals must get off the leash that is modem society (and technology) in order
arrive at <freedom>. Essentially, they must break free from society before a
proper engagement of the body can occur. If this is not accomplished, technology
may annihilate <freedom> in its pursuit of control over human behavior (e.g.,
through genetic engineering).
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I will now turn to a discussion of the ways Robert Pirsig employs the concept <ffeedom>
in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. This section of the overall analysis will be
concluded with a discussion of the implications both texts have for the concept
<freedom>, and I will highlight key similarities and differences between both authors,
drawing also on modem society’s conceptualization of <freedom> with respect to
technology.

Pirsig and <Freedom>
Our current modes o f rationality are
not moving society forward into a better
world. They are taking it further and
further from that better world. (Pirsig, p. 102)

Robert Pirsig’s employment of the concept <£reedom> is much more implicit than
what appears in Kaczynski’s Manifesto. The term itself is for the most part absent in Zen
and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, and Pirsig does not utilize synonymous concepts
such as autonomy. <Freedom> does play a prominant role in his discussion, though, as it
is invoked through a committee of related terms, such as peace o f mind and power.21
These terms are also discussed antithetically. Pirsig reserves significant discussion for the
ways individuals experience the opposite of peace o f mind, for example. I argue that
Pirsig invokes <freedom> in several ways: 1) by discussing “John” and “Sylvia,” and their
apparent hatred for technology; 2) by drawing upon additional negative experiences (some
of which are his own) that can be had with technology; 3) by positively relating his
experiences with his motorcycle; and 4) by making more general, theoretical statements
about the nature of <freedom> with respect to technology (and Quality). Each of these
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will be addressed seperately in what follows.
“John” and “Sylvia”
“John” and “Sylvia” are friends of the narrator (Pirsig) in Zen and the Art of
Motorcycle Maintenance, though they hold opposing views when it comes to technology.
John, like Pirsig, owns a motorcycle. Unlike Pirsig though, John does not feel one should
have to learn the mechanics of the motorcycle. Rather, the cycles should perform properly
at all times, as this is what their owners have paid for and expect. Pirsig recounts an
experience John had one day when he couldn’t get the cycle started. John reveals: “You
know...when it doesn’t start like that it just...really turns me into a monster inside. I just
get paranoic about it” (p. 12).
It is important to recall earlier discussion of modem society’s expectations for
technology with respect to <ffeedom>. Individuals have certain expectations for what
technology ought to do for their <freedom>. Among other things, technology ought to
contribute significantly to increasing jobs and increasing amounts of food. This
contribution by technology has implications for human <frredom>. For example, having
one’s necessities provided for ought to leave the individual free to pursue other avenues of
interest that contribute to what is perceived to be a fulfilling lifestyle. Additionally, many
individuals in modem American society experience great <freedom> of choice when it
comes to choosing which brand of product to buy, what type of home to live in, and even
where to work.
John’s experience with his motorcycle presents a different angle to the issue of
<freedom> and technology. He has this product, a BMW-R60 motorcycle, that he more
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than likely chose over other types of motorcycles. However, when it doesn’t perform as it
is expected to it frustrates him and turns him “into a monster inside.” Where technology
ought to contribute to an individual’s peace o f mind by providing for necessities like food,
clothing and shelter, here it contributes to the opposite, or antithesis of peace of mind, by
leaving John in a state of paranoia about whether the cycle will perform properly.
<Freedom> of choice is argued to be no kind of <freedom> at all if technological
innovations do not function as they are expected to.28 The <freedom> associated with
peace of mind is absent for John here, and what remains is an antithesis to peace of mind
(frustration, paranoia).
Pirsig recalls another experience (addressed briefly in “The Two Texts” section), in
which he is at John and Sylvia’s home, and he notices the kitchen sink faucet is dripping.
He remembers that the faucet has been dripping as long as he can remember, and that this
irritation has had an impact on John and Sylvia. One day, when Pirsig is talking to Sylvia
in the kitchen, the kids come into the room and Sylvia yells at them. Pirsig deduces that in
fact it is the dripping faucet that is the source of her anger, not the kids.
This experience compares well to John’s experience with the cycle. The faucet is
not functioning properly, and frustration is the end result.29 Pirsig asserts in a later
passage that John and Sylvia depend on technology while condemning it at the same time,
and that this must contribute significantly to their contempt for it. In fact, Pirsig draws
upon statements by John and Sylvia which echo this sentiment, such as “There’s just no
escape from it all” (p. 14). Here the perception is given that we as a society cannot break
free from technology and its negative ramifications. These ramifications take the form of
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experiences like the ones already mentioned and encounterd by John and Sylvia.
Eventually Pirsig arrives at a revelation that perhaps John and Sylvia really do care
about technology, but in a different way than he does. Here the reader encounters one of
many instances in which Pirsig addresses the classic-romantic split. It is argued that John
and Sylvia adopt a romantic perspective, concerning themselves more with what things
are and what things do for them than with what they mean and how they function. The
latter entails the classic perspective, which Pirsig argues to be his own. This choice of
perspective has implications for John and Sylvia where <freedom> is concerned. For
example, the narrator observes that when John gets upset over something like the cycle
not performing properly, it is because an intrusion on his reality has taken place. John has
a “groovy way of looking at things,” where appearance takes precedence over underlying
form. It is argued that this is acceptable, but that this perspective can come back to haunt
the individual in a number of ways. For example, Pirsig, Chris, John and Sylvia are cycling
through stretches of land that are at times extremely isolated. Pirsig suggests that John, by
not bringing along vital parts like spare plugs for his BMW-R60, and relying so heavily on
the reputation it has for running reliably, will be in a difficult situation should he encounter
mechanical trouble. Here again the antithesis to peace o f mind presents itself, as Pirsig
creates the image o f a constrained John, one who must at least acknowledge the thought
o f potential mechanical trouble. Though Pirsig utilizes the experiences and convictions of
John and Sylvia to invoke the concept of <freedom>, he does so in other ways as well.
Improper engagement of technology
Pirsig observes that many individuals arrive at an office or factory and perform
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what is perceived to be a totally meaningless job/task for eight hours a day without
question. They do so because society demands that it be so, but it is the perception that
their job or task is meaningless that is at the heart of the problem, Pirsig argues. It is
implied that these individuals are frustrated with their jobs, but perform them on a daily
basis because they have to in order to receive a paycheck every week. Thus, even though
technology helps to create jobs, which have the potential to lead to increased <freedom>,
the jobs themselves appear to constrain <freedom> when the perception exists that they
are meaningless. If individuals feel compelled to hold a job only because of the paycheck,
then chances are there exist other things they would rather devote eight hours a day to.
Though Pirsig does not mention it, certainly the specialization of labor that has developed
and now exists contributes to the perception that one’s job is meaningless. For the most
part, the “Jack-of-all-trades” has vanished, and a notion of craftsmanship is recognized by
few. What has commonly replaced these is a more monotonous office or factory position
that leaves little room for creativity.
The issue of constraint with respect to <freedom> appears again and at a more
subtle level when Pirsig is looking over a set of instructions for a rotisserie barbecue with
some friends. He suggests that what is really troublesome about the instructions is that
they imply there is only one way to assemble the rotisserie. It is this presumption that
wipes out all creativity and constrains the individual to one method or procedure. Pirsig
adds: “Technology presumes there’s just one right way to do things and there never is”
(p. 147). Essentially, individuals engage technology, but do so (or are forced to do so) in
ways that restrict <freedom>. Thus, even if the individual is unaware of it, creativity can
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I

be limited by things like instruction manuals that force him/her to adhere to only one
correct method of assembly. Pirsig proposes that this does not have to be the case. It is
just that we as a society have gotten use to things like assembly instructions beginning and
ending exclusively with the objects they instruct about. There exists no discussion about
the realtionship between the individual and the object, and the result of this is that
individuals feel far removed from things like rotisserie barbecues. By engaging technology
in ways that limit the potential for creativity, one is also restricting <freedom>. In this
case, a restriction o f creativity equals a restriction o f <freedom>.
Pirsig asserts that when the world is viewed not as a duality of mind and matter (or
subjects and objects) but as a “trinity of Quality, mind, and matter,” then motorcycle
maintenance and other “arts” become much more meaningful (p. 221). He argues though
that, in fact, a dualistic way of viewing subjects and objects is what exists at present, and
he himself has perceived things as such in the past. Pirsig recalls experiences had with his
motorcycle, ones that occurred when he had not known much about its mechanics. One
involves misdiagnosing a problem he had with the cycle during a storm, and the other
entails taking the cycle to a group of lousy mechanics for repairs he could not do because
he lacked the necessary knowledge. During the former Pirsig presents himself as being
scared and anxious, anything but experiencing a kind of peace o f mind that one hopes
technology can deliver. During the latter experience, Pirsig characterizes himself as
feeling helpless, frustrated, and lacking control over the situation. All of these feelings can
be characterized as antitheses to <freedom>. He wishes he had known more about the
cycle at the time, as the mechanics took poor care of it in trying to repair it. Pirsig
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maintains that this was because they simply did not care about the work they were doing.
Pirsig believes that a dualistic form of perceiving subjects and objects is sufficient
as long as vital needs such as food, clothing and shelter predominate. However, because
most individuals are now able to look beyond these needs, a new form of rationality is
necessary. Pirsig suggests that the current form of rationality is no longer adequate, and
the implication is that human <ffeedom> is what is being sacrificed.30 It is no longer
enough for individuals to be fed, clothed, and provided with shelter. The search for
fulfillment takes on new forms, and it is precisely these new forms that is causing feelings
of frustration, anxiety, helplessness, etc.
The preceding point requires explication. First, it can be assumed that for most
people the kind of peace of mind that comes with having necessities like food and clothing
provided has been achieved. This, I have argued, results in <freedom> by allowing the
individual to pursue other avenues for fulfillment in addition to providing him/her with
greater <ffeedom> of choice in various matters. However, because individuals can now
look elsewhere for fulfillment, the potential exists for peace of mind to be sacrificed in
other ways, and replaced with feelings of frustration. For example, people will be more
critical of consumer goods, and when a product has defects or imperfections consumers
will not only feel slighted, but frustrated by having spent the time and money to purchase
the product.31 The same holds true for a hobbyist who purchases a piece of equipment
necessary for his/her hobby. Expectations exist for how the equipment ought to perform.
Even the service industry is examined more critically. Pirsig’s example of the mechanics
who did a poor job of repairing his cycle illustrates the point that a lack of caring in
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performing one’s job has negative implications for individual <freedom>. Interestingly
enough, in this particular case the implications will be felt by the mechanics as well as the
customer. The mechanics do not receive the fulfillment associated with doing a job right,
and the customer is likely frustrated by taking a vehicle in for service that was not
performed properly. Pirsig on the other hand describes for his reader the relationship he
has developed with his cycle, and the benefits this has created.
Pirsig and the cycle
Pirsig asserts that over time a motorcycle develops a kind of personality. That is,
its owner picks up certain feelings about the machine that are unique to that machine, and
its personality is characterized as “the intuitive sum total of everything you know and feel
about it” (p. 39). He continues by adding that motorcycles begin as new strangers, and
either deteriorate rapidly or turn into dependable, long-lasting friends. Pirsig’s cycle is an
example of the latter, as he notes that it has required fewer and fewer repairs as time has
passed.
Referencing the cycle as a “long-lasting friend” emphasizes Pirsig’s personal
investment in the cycle. More than this, though, is that the owner considers himself or
herself to be engaged in a relationship with the cycle, one which is initiated by the owner.
This is actually one of Pirsig’s principle reccomendations for how individuals ought to
engage technology, and a direct result of this is that the individual will experience greater
<freedom>. The reason the cycle has required so few repairs as it has gotten older is
precisely because of the investment Pirsig has placed in the cycle and the relationship he
has forged with it: It is implied that by engaging, in this case, the cycle, one will know
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more about its mechanics and how to treat any potential trouble. Possessing this
knowledge about the machine and its mechanics contributes to greater peace of mind and
a sense of control over how to handle the machine and take care of it. This peace o f mind
and sense o f control are equatable to <freedom>, in that the individual who experiences
these is free from worry andfeelings o f helplessness.
This point can further be illustrated by the following passage:
That’s the reason I’m checking it now. If it is a loose rod and I try to make it to
the mountains without an overhaul, it will soon get louder and louder until the
rod tears itself free, slams into the spinning crankshaft and destroys the engine.
(p. 85).

Pirsig is performing a check of the cycle in order to ascertain whether or not he can make
it to the mountains. The reason he is able to make a judgment based on his observations is
because he has taken the time to learn about the machine. The benefits of this are, again,
peace of mind and a sense of control over the situation. The antitheses of these are
feelings of helplessness and perhaps even paranoia. These would exist for an individual
who has not taken the time to engage the motorcycle and understand its mechanics. It is
assumed that for this individual, if the rod tears itself free and destroys the engine, what
ensues will likely be feelings of anger and frustration, which are antithetical to <ffeedom>.
By applying his knowledge o f the cycle and taking the time to inspect it, it is implied that
Pirsig will experience a peace o f mind that will leave him free to concentrate on other
matters.
In a conversation with a sculptor, Pirsig mentions that he does a lot of welding in
the process of maintaining his motorcycle. The welder and Pirsig articulate similar reasons
for welding. Namely, that once the skill is picked up it can offer the welder a tremendous
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feeling of power and control over the metal. This feeling of power and control is nearly
synonymous with the type of <freedom> of choice that comes with having creativity at
your fingertips. Pirsig adds that one can do just about anything with metal if the skill is
present. The implicit message is that acquiring skill in welding or other pursuits is a
necessary step in engaging that pursuit in such a way that will lead one to experience a
sense of power, control, creativity, peace of mind, etc. These ends are all connected to
<freedom>.
An example of Pirsig being on the road with the cycle and experiencing peace of
mind comes when he comments that “the road is smooth and clean and the engine now has
a ‘packed,’ high rpm sound that says it’s right on” (p. 26). Pirsig further explains that a
storm is upon them, but the sense is given that the cycle will get him to shelter safely
because it is performing well. Pirsig is able to ascertain that the sound of the engine is a
good one, one which “says it’s right on,” but he is only able to realize this because he
possesses a knowledge about the cycle and understands it. I argue that the peace of mind
this brings him is also closely related to a sense of security. Pirsig feels secure on the
cycle, despite the imminence of the storm. Security and peace o f mind essentially amount
to <freedom>, as Pirsig experiences a kind o f “mental liberation ’’from feelings o f
helplessness and skepticism. Additionally, this sense of security is presented as much
more stable than what John experiences on his cycle. Any security John feels must be
attributed to the reputation his BMW-R60 has for performing well, and it is this reputation
that he is banking on.
Pirsig reveals that he will probably never sell the motorcycle. He adds that if they
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are kept tuned and overhauled they can last for what seems like an eternity. Because he
has done this, the cycle will continue to perform when called upon. Peace of mind is a
significant end result of this. Pirsig suggests that it is an understanding of Quality which
has allowed the cycle to carry him so far without trouble.
Theorizing about <freedom>
I have argued that Pirsig invokes the concept of <freedom> by drawing upon
related concepts and their antitheses. One such concept is peace o f mind. Pirsig employs
this concept literally in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance during the discussion
of the rotisserie barbecue assembly instructions:
I’ve a set o f instructions at home which...begin, “assembly o f Japanese bicycle
requires great peace o f mind.”...Peace o f mind...it’s the whole thing. That
which produces it is good maintenance...The ultimate test’s always your own
serenity. If you don’t have this when you start and maintain it while you’re
working you’re likely to build your personal problems right into the machine...
(p. 146)

Here we have a direct reference to peace of mind, and Pirsig implicates it not only as an
end state but as a necessary precursor to the Quality-seeking process. That is, not only
will “good maintenance” produce it, but it must be present at the start of the maintenance
process. I’ve discussed in detail the type of peace of mind that is an end, along with its
relation to <freedom>. However, Pirsig also declares that peace of mind is necessary for
an individual to start working. He asserts that if this isn’t present at the start, one is likely
build one’s “personal problems right into the machine.” The implicit suggestion is that
frustration and anger will likely be the result, and it is here that antitheses to <ffeedom>
emerge once again.32
Pirsig makes mention of “the system” in ways that are not unlike Kaczynski’s
79

characterization of it. Essentially, he understands the system to be the structure of modem
society as we know it. Pirsig proposes that a tme understanding of Quality does more
than just serve the system or even escape it. Rather, a true understanding “captures” the
system and puts it to work for one’s own use. It is argued that this will leave the
individual free to fulfill his or her inner destiny. Ambiguities inherent in this particular
passage leave the reader to guess at what exactly Pirsig is aiming for when he claims that
individuals can put the system to work for their own use. What the reader can assume
from this, however, is that a genuine understanding of and appreciation for Quality will
lead the individual to increased <freedom>. Essentially, one will be free to fulfill one’s
inner destiny.
In a later passage Pirsig suggests again that discovering and understanding Quality
has significant implications for <freedom> at, say, the workplace. “What’s important is
the relevance of such a discovery to...all the dull, dreary jobs and monotonous years that
await all o f us in them” (p. 229). Quality is seen as savior here, for it is argued that it has
the potential to lift the perverbial fog that resides over what are perceived to be
meaningless and monotonous jobs. Quality leads to liberation, and this liberation takes the
form of <freedom>. Pirsig holds that individuals who discover Quality will be set free
from the dreariness and monotony that once characterized worklife. Thus, the argument
being made is that Quality can be implicated even at the level of one’s own job, and
<freedom> with respect to technology can be experienced without escaping technology.
As Pirsig suggests: “The Buddha...resides quite as comfortably in the circuits of a digital
computer or the gears of a cycle transmission as he does at the top of mountain or in the
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petals of a flower” (p. 16). Pirsig’s reference to the Buddha would eventually develop
into his working concept of Quality, and the message is clear that individuals need not
retreat to the wilderness to discover Quality and experience <freedom>. What is needed
is a re-evaluation of the ways one perceives of these things.
I have argued that Pirsig invokes the concept of <freedom>, but that he does so
much more implicitly than Kaczynski. In summarizing:
o

Pirsig chooses to rely on other concepts to draw the connection between
<freedom> and technology, such as peace o f mind, control, power, security and
creativity. He also incorporates the antitheses to some of these concepts, such as
frustration, helplessness, paranoia, and constraint.

o

Pirsig makes use of characters John and Sylvia and his own experiences with the
motorcycle in drawing the connection between <freedom> and technology.
Additionally, he addresses some of the ways individuals (including himself) can
negatively engage technology (e.g., upholding subject-object dualisms) so as to
restrict <freedom>.

o

Pirsig makes what can be considered more general arguments about the nature of
<freedom> and Quality. For example, peace of mind is not only an end state when
Quality is pursued, but a precursor to the pursuit itself. It can translate into
fulfillment and liberation for the individual, since feelings of frustration and
helplessness will be absent.
In the following section, I will draw on both Kaczynski and Pirsig to compare and

contrast their conceptualizations of <freedom> with contemporary American society’s
perceived expectations and hopes for what technology ought to accomplish for individual
<freedom>. Additionally, I will address the question of how each author’s argumentative
style affects the way they choose to reconcile <freedom> with technology, if at all. In
doing so, I will be referring back to the initial diagram illustrating the two-step argument
for both Kaczynski and Pirsig.33
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Kaczynski. Pirsig. and <Freedom>
One observation left unaddressed up to this point is that Kaczynski applies many of
the same concepts Pirsig does in discussing technology and <lfeedom>. That is,
Kaczynski also makes reference to feelings offrustration, anger and security (along with
the sense of purposelessness that he believes many experience). The difference between
Pirsig and Kaczynski is that for Pirsig these concepts (peace o f mind, etc.) are the primary
means by which he discusses <freedom> alongside technology. The result is a text which
invokes <freedom> implicitly. Kaczynski however references <freedom> more explicitly
by using the term itself or a more arguable synonym: autonomy. It is for this reason that
these terms receive the bulk of the attention when analyzing the Manifesto.34
Kaczynski believes individuals must break free from society altogether in order to
arrive at what he considers to be an adequate amount of <ffeedom>, or autonomy. Only
when the individual no longer relies on society to provide for him necessities like food and
shelter can s/he truly be free?5 Pirsig on the other hand suggests that technology is
reconcilable with modem society, and that <freedom> can be an end result if individuals
discover and strive for Quality. So, while Kaczynski concentrates his development of
<freedom> in step one of his argument, Pirsig chooses to situate <freedom> in step two
for his. The way <freedom> is situated by Kaczynski and Pirsig in their overall arguments
affects how they develop the concept.
Kaczynski reasons that technology cannot be reconciled in such a way as to ensure
individual <ffeedom>. Its continued development will lead to greater encroachments on
<freedom>, and the only way to avoid this is to revolt against the structure that is modem
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industrial-technological society. The reader of the Manifesto is given, in most scenarios
and arguments presented, only two options. These options include either allowing
technological development to continue or abolishing it entirely. Kaczynski warns that
reform is not an option, as any attempt at such will be too weak to have a significant and
long-term impact.
Although Kaczynski does provide two options for his reader, he advocates only
one. This is where we can begin to see how his argumentative style affects his
employment of the concept <freedom>. Virtually all o f Kaczynski’s comments regarding
<freedom> are presented in such a way that the reader is never far removedfrom the
assumption that the individuals that make up society must breakfree from technology in
order to ensure <freedom>. In proposing that individuals have the option to allow
technological development to proceed along its current path, Kaczynski paints a picture of
the future for his reader. This picture reveals that individual autonomy or <freedom> will
gradually be stripped away until the result is near complete control over human behavior
by technology.36 He cites recent trends in genetic engineering as a precursor to the
eventual genetic constitution of our children and gradual engineering of our species. For
Kaczynski, the bottom line is that individuals are on the “leash” that is modem society (or
the system), and it is impossible to ensure human <ffeedom> while we remain on this
leash.37 Furthermore, by remaining on this leash we are ensuring that our <freedom> will
continually be restricted. Kaczynski’s development of the concept <freedom> is therefore
emphasized in step one of his argument, which proposes that individuals must break free
from society in order to arrive at true fulfillment.
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For Pirsig, step one is not that individuals must abolish technology and modem
society, but that they must re-orient their values and come to understand and embrace
Quality. By doing so, and striving for Quality (at work, in their hobbies, etc.), <ffeedom>
(step two) can be attained. This will take the form of peace o f mind, security, creativity,
and/or a sense of power and control. Situating <freedom> in step two of his proposed
process affects the way Pirsig employs the concept.
Pirsig invokes the concept of <freedom>, and what I might call its siblings (peace
of mind, security, etc.), by closely connecting it to step one of his argument: that
individuals must first understand and strive for Quality in their pursuits. That is, virtually
all o f Pirsig’s comments regarding <freedom> are connected to the assumption that
individuals either do or do not pursue Quality. The fact that Pirsig connects arguments
about <ffeedom> to Quality appears to make sense, since it is Quality that he isolates as a
necessary precursor to arriving at <freedom>. It should be recalled that Pirsig relies on a
usage of antitheses to <freedom>, such as feelings of frustration, helplessness, constraint,
and lack o f control. He does so in order to distinguish between what it means to pursue
Quality and what it means to pursue something in a non-Quality way. It is for this reason
that I argue the assumption exists that individuals do or do not pursue Quality.
This assumption by Pirsig gives the immediate impression that he is presenting a
black- and-white, two-option argument in much the same way that Kaczynski does so.
People are either in pursuit of Quality or they are not. However, Pirsig reveals that
<freedom> takes multiple forms, such as peace of mind, power and control. The bottom
line for Pirsig is that a discussion of <freedom> must also entail a discussion of the Quality
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experience, or lack there of. Having discussed how the argumentative styles of Kaczynski
and Pirsig affect the ways they invoke the concept <freedom>, it is now necessary to turn
to a comparison of the ways their arguments echo and/or differ from society’s perception
of the connection between <freedom> and technology.
Throughout my analysis of the ways Kaczynski and Pirsig discuss <freedom> with
respect to technology, I have also been discussing how they feel technology affects our
<freedom> as members of society. Despite this, it may prove helpful to step back and
situate their arguments more broadly. I have argued that society has certain expectations
and hopes for what technology ought to accomplish for individual <freedom>. For
example, it is hoped that technology will contribute to an increasing number of jobs and
larger quantites of food to sustain greater numbers of people. It is expected that
<freedom> will come with the peace of mind experienced by having one’s vital needs
provided for. Additionally, it is expected1that a greater <freedom> of choice will exist in
having more options to choose from when purchasing a product.38 Kaczynski and Pirsig
look to assess the impact technology has on human <freedom>.
Kaczynski suggests that it is by providing for our vital needs that technology
contributes to a sense of purposelessness that many of us experience. Technology, and
modem society, has us on a leash, and being on this leash has consequences. For example,
Kaczynski notes that many individuals get worked up about the right to bear arms simply
because owning a gun puts an element of personal security back into their hands.
Kaczynski also proposes that the leash we are on is constantly restricting our freedom, not
broadening it. Essentially, Kaczynski believes that technology does more to constrain us
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that it can ever do to liberate us. He would argue that the providing of jobs and food
carries with it too many negative ramifications. Furthermore, individuals ought to re
assess why it is they wish to have these things provided for them in the first place, rather
than providing for themselves.
Pirsig suggests that it is true that technology has provided many with the
necessities of food, clothing and shelter. Because of this, though, individuals now look
elsewhere for fulfillment. More attention is currently being given to the Quality of
products and services. As a result of this, two things need to occur: 1) Individuals who
produce and provide these products and services need to strive for Quality in doing so,
and 2) Individuals who use technology need to engage it more properly, also by striving
for Quality in these pursuits. Thus, Pirsig argues that technology can be reconciled with
modem society in a way that promotes individual <freedom>. Kaczynski, however, asserts
that technology cannot be reconciled with modem society in a way that will not
continually restrict individual <ffeedom>.
Having analyzed the ideograph <ffeedom> as it appears in Kaczynski’s Manifesto
and Pirsig’s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. I will now direct my attention to
a discussion of the ways both authors implicate the body in their texts. It is important to
preface this part of the analysis by mentioning that the concept of <freedom> and this
notion of the implicated body are not completely separate entities. In fact, the two are
more closely interwoven than they are distinct. It is difficult to discuss one of these, as the
authors present them, without also discussing the other. As a result of this, my reader may
observe that some of the passages mentioned and analyzed in the former section may again
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fall under a critical lens in the following one. However, the angle taken to examine these
passages a second time will be different, as I will be focusing on ways Pirsig and
Kaczynski implicate the body in their respective discussions of technology.
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o

CHAPTER 7: THE IMPLICATED BODY

Both Kaczynski and Pirsig implicate the body in their discussions of technology
and society. However, they do so in different ways. It can be recalled that for Pirsig,
engaging the body and striving for Quality is what can lead to greater freedom in modem
society. Kaczynski suggests that individuals must first procure freedom from society
before any proper engagement of the body can occur. The result of getting off the “leash”
that is society will be, consequently, increased levels of freedom.
It might appear that an equal amount of difficulty exists in separating freedom from
what I call the implicated body in each author’s work.39 Upon closer examination of the
texts, though, it is Pirsig’s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance which allows for
an easier distinction between the two concepts to be drawn. The reason behind this is
Pirsig’s employment of multiple themes in his text. That is, by appealing to metaphors and
analogies Pirsig is able to draw a connection between his cross-country motorcycle trip
and his more theoretical discussion about the nature of technology with respect to modem
society. This connection more clearly distinguishes Pirsig’s discussion of the body from
his discussion of freedom. Kaczynski on the other hand does not cross over from one
theme to another in the Manifesto. Rather, he sticks to one theme: a theoretical
discussion of technology and modem society. Because of this, the distinction between
freedom and the body is more difficult to discuss. Essentially, by employing multiple
themes, Pirsig also invokes the body in different ways, and it is easier for the reader to
distinguish between the body and freedom than it is the single-themed Manifesto. It is
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with the Manifesto that I shall begin a discussion of the implicated body.

Kaczvnski and The Implicated Body
In addressing the ways Kaczynski implicates the body in his discussion of
technology, I’ve isolated what I believe to be a series of phases that his argument proceeds
through. First, I will address Kaczynski’s argument that individuals improperly engage
their bodies in modem society. I will then proceed into a discussion of what I believe
Kaczynski assumes to be the ramifications of technology where the body is concerned.
Finally, and much like the Manifesto’s discussion of freedom, I will examine Kaczynski’s
arguments for what the future holds for the individual’s body.
Improper engagement of the body
Recall Kaczynski’s argument that individuals have a need for what he calls the
power process, and that this process has four elements: goal, effort, attainment of goal,
and autonomy. The Manifesto advocates fairly early that the individual suffers when the
power process is not engaged properly by the body:
Nonattainment [sic] o f important goals results in death if the goals are
physical necessities Consistent failure to attain goals throughout life
results in defeatism, low self-esteem or depression Thus, in order to avoid
serious psychological problems, a human being needs goals whose
attainment requires effort, and he must have a reasonable rate o f success
in attaining his goals, (p. 7)

The “physical necessities” are indicative of food, clothing, and shelter. Their attainment
requires physical effort on the part of the individual, as long as the power process is
engaged properly. This passage sets up later discussion of the argument that in modernday society, human beings do not have sufficient capabilities for engaging the power
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process in any significant way. Kaczynski asserts that human beings, instead of having
these “real” goals, fall back on surrogate activities in hopes of finding fulfillment. In fact,
the equating of physical necessities to “important goals” as it appears in the first sentence
of the preceding passage suggests a preference for making one’s goals physical necessities.
When this is not the case, psychological problems are implied to be a result.40
Because most individuals are not required to exert themselves physically in order
to procure necessities like food, clothing and shelter, Kaczynski argues that surrogate
activites are what individuals pursue as a replacement. He suggests that surrogate
activities are directed toward goals that people set up for themselves simply for the sake of
having a goal to work toward (and the perceived fulfillment that results from this). Thus,
if an individual takes up tennis, Kaczynski would reason this to be a surrogate activity
because the individual would not pursue this activity if his/her effort were directed toward
satisfying the vital needs of food, clothing and shelter. That is, as long as the effort
directed toward satisfying vital needs requires the individual to use his or her physical
and mental facilities in varied ways, then the desire to pursue surrogate activities such as
tennis should remain absent f
Kaczynski observes that individuals assert a similar amount of effort in pursuing
their surrogate activities that they would in pursuing real goals. A critic of Kaczynski
might argue that if an individual is asserting physical effort toward a surrogate activity,
and that surrogate activity provides fulfillment, then there is nothing wrong with having
surrogate activities. Kaczynski would suggest that a problem does exist in that the power
process (and consequently, the body) is not being engaged properly. Implied here is that
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surrogate activities do not adequately engage the power process because they come with
strings attached. These strings amount to society and its constraints. Being able to pursue
and engage surrogate activities means being on the “leash” that is society, and this
translates into, according to Kaczynski, restricted levels of freedom. Here we see one
example of just how closely related the concepts of freedom and the body are for
Kaczynski. Essentially, the body cannot engage the power process properly in pursuing a
surrogate activity because freedom is so restricted in other spheres of life.42
The points discussed above receive additional attention in later passages:
In modem industrial society only minimal effort is necessary to satisfy one’s
physical needs The only requirements are a moderate amount o f intelligence,
and most o f all, simple OBEDIENCE. If one has those, society takes care o f one
from cradle to grave, (p. 8)

and
Many people who pursue surrogate activities will say that they get far more
fulfillment from these activities than they do from satisfying their
biological needs, but that is because in our society the effort needed
to satisfy the biological needs has been reduced to triviality, (p. 8)

In these passages, society is seen as “taking care of the individual” if the individual
conforms to the system. As long as s/he chooses not to make physical necessities primary
or “real” goals, the system will provide for him/her (speaking of the general population).
Even further, it is implied that society, in providing for one’s vital needs, is not allowing
the individual to adequately engage the body. Because society provides this, it is implied
that only minimal effort is required to attain the goals of physical necessities. As a result,
no real bodily effort is put forth by the individual in a significant way. This is articulated
again in the second passage. It is suggested that people believe they get more fulfillment
from pursuing surrogate activities than they do from satisfying biological needs.
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Here we can see similarites to previous discussion. Kaczynski suggests that
individuals turn to surrogate activities for fulfillment “...because in our society the effort
needed to satisfy biological needs has been reduced to triviality.” Thus, an individual
works a job, gets paid, and provides for oneself, but does not do so by exerting oneself
physically in a direct manner. That is, an individual may have to exert oneself physically at
work, say as a construction worker, but this is done in order to secure a paycheck, which
is then used to procure necessities such as food, clothing and shelter. No real physical
effort is applied toward directly providing these vital necessities for oneself. Providing for
one’s own physical necessities makes the process of providing much more significant,
Kaczynski argues. He points out that it is in fact no surprise that society is full of
surrogate activities, for individuals are searching for fulfillment. Society, in making it easy
for individuals to secure physical necessities, has forced them to look elsewhere for it. If
individuals were forced to exert themselves physically (and mentally) to procure these,
there would be no need for surrogate activities.
Kaczynski proceeds into a classification of what he calls “human drives,” of which
he argues there are three types. The first type consists of drives that can be satisfied with
very little effort, and in modem society vital needs like food and shelter unfortunately
reside here (for many), acording to Kaczynski. The second type includes those drives
which can be satisfied, but only through considerable effort on the part of the individual.
The third type of human drives consists of those which cannot be satisfied regardless of
the amount of effort put forth by the individual. These drives are relative to the individual.
For example, certain individuals cannot become “supermodels” or “doctors” because their
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physical appearances or learning capabilities do not comply with society’s expectations for
these occupations.
Kaczynski asserts that the “power process” is intended to satisfy the drives of the
second group (e.g., the pursuit of primary/real goals), but that modem society has pushed
most human drives into either the first or third groups. The result of this, Kaczynski
argues, is an increasing number of individuals who experience frustration, anger,
depression...etc. What largely remains for the second type of human drives, those for
which Kaczynski argues the power process is intended, are surrogate activities (e.g., jobs,
hobbies).
Kaczynski is imlpying here that individuals are not sufficiently satisfying those
human drives which require serious effort. He reasons that surrogate activites have been
inserted into this type of human drive, but that this is somehow not enough for the
individual. Kaczynski suggests this to be the case in pointing to what he believes to be a
significant and growing number of individuals who frequently experience feelings of
frustration, anger...etc. Again there appears to be some equivocality in the way Kaczynski
presents the argument, as the reader of the Manifesto is uncertain as to what sorts of
things are being pursued in the first and third types of human drives. It can be assumed,
though (and Kaczynski does attempt to clear this up in later passages), that for many
individuals it is the physical necessities of food, clothing and shelter which are now a part
of those drives which can be satisfied by exerting only a small amount of effort.
Regarding those drives which cannot be satisfied even when effort is exerted, greater
ambiguity exists. Perhaps Kaczynski would argue that autonomy is a central characteristic

93

to drives in this group, and the perceived lack of this is what makes them impossible to
achieve. For Kaczynski, the power process belongs in type two human drives, but this
process must include a proper engagement o f the body, and must therefore not include
surrogate activities. It is here that Kaczynski makes reference to primitive societies,
arguing that these societies satisfied physical necessities as a part of those drives requiring
considerable effort, and the result was increased levels of fulfillment (and less frustration,
anger...etc.). Much of Kaczynski’s discussion in what I have categorized as “improper
engagement of the body” could arguably appear in the following section and vice-versa.
However, it is my argument that dividing Kaczynski’s discussion of the body into
categories allows for a clearer articulation of his reasoning. I now turn to what I consider
to be a discussion of the ramifications of technology with respect to the body.
Ramifications of technology
Kaczynski asserts that technology is a primary contributor to the deprivation that
occurs regarding the individual’s experience of the power process. One result includes
feelings of frustration, unfulfillment, purposelessness...etc. Additionally, Kaczynski argues
that the modem individual is obsessed with a notion of longevity and with maintaining
physical vigor and attractiveness to an advanced age. Again, it is reasoned that this is a
result of not significantly engaging the power process.
It has been observed that Kaczynski advocates a more proper experience of the
power process, one which engages the body both physically and mentally in pursuing vital
necessities such as food, clothing and shelter. He argues that individuals instead apply the
power process to surrogate activities in the search for fulfillment, and that feelings of
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frustration stem from being on the leash that is society. However, in the preceding
passage Kaczynski is making a different sort of argument. This one holds that individuals
are even more obsessed with their physical bodies than they would be if the power process
were applied in an adequate manner. Because individuals in modem society have not
engaged their bodies in pursuing real or primary goals, lack of fulfillment remains. The
result of this is a greater amount of attention being devoted to maintaining one’s physical
image. Indeed, Kaczynski explicates this point in the following passage:
Many modem people...are disturbed by the prospect o f death...We argue that
this is due to unfulfillment resulting from the fact that they have never put their
physical powers to any use, have never gone through the power process using
their bodies in a serious way. It is...the primitive man...whose need for the
power process has been satisfied during his life who is best prepared to accept
the end o f that life. (p. 14)

Kaczynski makes the perceived connection clearer between the modem
individual’s fear of death (and growing old) and the type of unfulfillment that results from
never experiencing the power process in a significant way. Essentially, it is argued that
the obsession many individuals have with maintaining their bodies and physical appearance
is a result of never engaging their bodies in the pursuit of real goals. Thus, not only are
individuals unfulfilled, but they devote excessive amounts of attention to maintaining their
bodies. Kaczynski proposes that this attention could be diverted elsewhere if the body
was engaged properly, and the power process was directed toward satisfying one’s vital
needs.
In a later passage Kaczynski declares that even if the most cherished fruits of
technology were preserved while the rest of the system were dismantled, these “fruits”
would by themselves harbor evil. He uses the example of medicine, and argues that if
95

cures for diseases such as diabetes were discovered, those individuals with a genetic
tendency toward them would then be able to survive and reproduce as well as anyone.
Kaczynski asserts that natural selection against such genes will cease and these genes will
likely spread throughout the population. The image conjured here is that of an infected
collective body that is the human race. It is argued that this may already be “in the works”
today, in that advances in medicine and genetics are allowing many diseases to be
controlled. This is a rare use of metaphor by Kaczynski, one which appears again later.
Kaczynski suggests that there will inevitably be only one solution: a program designed to
genetically engineer human beings. The result will be a human species that is, essentially,
a manufactured product. This point will receive greater attention in the next section,
where I examine Kaczynski’s discussion of the future with respect to the body.
Kaczynski is accurate in arguing that many diseases will likely be cured, or at least
sufficiently controlled. However, in asserting that there will inevitably be only one
solution, the genetic engineering of human beings, Kaczynski leaves no room for the
possibility that these diseases will be eliminated altogether. Furthermore, the argument
can be made that if a cure is found for a disease that cannot be wiped out, then it really
does not matter whether an individual’s genetic tendency toward that disease increases.
Kaczynski might argue that these types of medical developments function to create an
individual that will be much less “pure” than modem individuals. However, the appeal to
what Kaczynski perceives to be an infected collective body leads him to a narrowly
conceived vision of medical progress and the fate of the human race. Only one solution is
envisioned, and no room is left for additional outcomes. The preceding mini-discussion
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provides a segue into Kaczynski’s discussion of what the future holds, and how the body
is implicated.
The future
As discussed in the ideographic section, Kaczynski asserts that one of two
scenarios will unfold where technology and society are concerned, and both have
implications for the way we as a race will conceive of our bodies. In a continuation from a
previous discussion on the potential for genetic engineering, Kaczynski connects this to
what he refers to as government interference in the daily lives of its citizens:
If you think big government interferes in your life too much NOW, just
wait till [sic] the government starts regulating the genetic constitution of
your children. Such regulation will inevitably follow the introduction o f
genetic engineering o f human beings, because the consequences o f unregulated
genetic engineering would be disastrous, (p. 23)

Once again Kaczynski appeals to the metaphor of an infected collective body, and both
technology and government regulation are sources of the “infection.” The implications
fo r the body in a technological society are suggested to be so detrimental that we as a
society will no longer have control over our own genetic make-up. The system will assert
its dominance over us to such an extent that the future of the body will have to be
conceptualized in an entirely different way. Words like “natural” and “biological”
seemingly will be replaced by “artificial” and “genetically engineered.” The body, our
bodies, will be altered to the system’s liking to the point where while we once conceived
of our internal and biological states to be our own, now even this has surrendered to the
system. The certainty invoked by Kaczynski is that technology is creating a physical and
social environment for the human race that is radically different from the environment
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primitive man evolved through. Once again, the body and freedom are interwoven in this
discussion.
In making additional references to genetic engineering and the fate of the human
race, Kaczynski argues that those aspects of the body that affect mental functioning will
also be modified by the system. He proposes that the genetic engineering of human beings
is actually taking its first shape in the form of gene therapy. Kaczynski reasons that it is
only natural to assume such methods will make their way into the realm of mental
functioning where humans are concerned. The implicit message suggests that the human
race (and the body) will not only be affected at the physical level. Our mental capacities
will also fall prey to the technological development of the system.
Losing control over our own bodies at the physical as well as mental levels is not
proposed to happen all at once.43 Rather, Kaczynski argues it will take the form of a more
gradual process. This process will be nearly impossible to resist, as each new “innovation”
will appear by itself to be beneficial. Essentially, Kaczynski asserts that the human race
will be forced to undergo a type of “social evolution.” That is, we will evolve to meet the
demands of the social structure. The consequences of this evolution include a
surrendering of how we presently conceptualize the control we have over our bodies.
In a passage that received discussion in the ideographic section of the analysis,
Kaczynski suggests that technology will eventually achieve near complete control over
human behavior. He proceeds to reveal that it has been established that human behavior
has a primarily biological basis. That is, researchers and experimenters have been able to
demonstrate that sensations such as hunger, anger, and fear can be adjusted by electrically
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stimulating the brain. This passage creates more of a connection between biological
functions of the body (including subsequent behaviors) and the potential for technology to
tap into these in an effort to achieve control. If the reader of the Manifesto experiences
feelings of skepticism about the potential for the genetic engineering of the human
population, it can be argued that this passage serves to remove or at least alleviate some of
that skepticism. To accomplish this, the argument proposed is one which makes the
potential for technological control over human behavior (and physicality) that much more
imminent.
Kaczynski counters one future that envisions the human race without control over
their bodies with another that envisions the human race living close to nature and engaging
their bodies in a fulfilling manner. He argues that individuals, in the wake of an abolished
technological structure, will be forced to live close to nature because this will be necessary
for survival. In advocating what he calls “wild nature,” Kaczynski includes human nature.
By this he means “those aspects of the functioning of the human individual that are not
subject to regulation by organized society” (p. 36). Thus, while it may be difficult for
individuals to adjust to a lifestyle absent of technology, the body will finally be engaging
the power process in a way that it used to (e.g., primitive man) and a way that it ought to.
In order to experience the power process through the body, individuals will
procure vital necessities such as food, clothing and shelter by being peasants, herdsmen,
fishermen, hunters...etc. Survival will be the primary goal as well as a constant motivation
for the individual. Kaczynski argues that fulfillment will be the result of procuring vital
necessities for oneself by engaging the body in a way that physical and mental effort are
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exerted in varied ways. Surrogate activities will cease to exist, and individuals will instead
experience the power process by pursuing real or primary goals. Kaczynski argues it is
here that the body will be engaged in ways that produce fulfillment. Moreover, by existing
in a world removedfrom technology individuals will surrender recurrent feelings o f
frustration, purposelessness, and anger that Kaczynski argues to be so characteristic o f
living in modern society.
My reader may recall Kaczynski’s assumption that not only are surrogate activities
characteristic of improperly experiencing the power process (by not pursuing real goals),
but that the perceived levels of fulfillment individuals get from these are actually counter
balanced by being on the “leash” that is modem society. Recall that consequences of
being on this leash take the form of frustration, anger, and feelings of purposelessness,
among other things. Therefore, Kaczynski suggests that even if individuals believe
surrogate activities provide them fulfillment, this comes at a cost. Any fulfillment that may
be experienced is essentially nullified.
By living close to nature and free of technology, Kaczynski proposes that not only
will the body be well served by experiencing the power process in the pursuit of real goals.
In addition to this, individuals will discover fulfillment that comes with no strings attached.
That is, feelings of frustration and anger that come with engaging the body by pursuing
surrogate activities will no longer prevail. The benefits Kaczynski outlines take on
multiple forms where the body is concerned.
I have addressed the Manifesto’s discussion of what I call the implicated body. I
argue that Kaczynski’s discussion of the body can best be understood by categorizing it
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into, namely: 1) improper engagement of the body, 2) ramifications of technology, and 3)
the future. These categorizations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as I have pointed
out. Some of Kaczynski’s arguments could easily slide from one section to another.
Despite this, I believe that by categorizing his overall argument with respect to the body in
this way, a clearer articulation of that argument is allowed for. What can now be
understood from the Manifesto is that:
o

An improper engagement of the body leads to an improper engagment of the
power process, and in modem society individuals rely upon surrogate activites for
what is perceived to be fulfillment, rather than relying upon primary or real goals.

o

Relying upon surrogate activities leads individuals to, ironically, continued feelings
of unfulfillment due to the consequences that accompany being on the leash that is
modem society (e.g., the obsession with maintaining one’s physical appearance
that is a result of never engaging the body in a significant manner).

o

The future poses two possibilities for the human race. One is depicted essentially
as an infected collective body, where advances in medicine and genetic engineering
allow for near complete control over behavior to occur. The other is depicted as a
race living close to nature, engaging the body physically and mentally in the pursuit
of primary goals. One result of this is increased levels of fulfillment and freedom.
It has become evident that the line separating freedom and the body in the

Manifesto’s discussion of technology is a fairly blurred one. A significant portion of the
arguments presented about the body also incorporate concepts like control and autonomy.
Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance creates a distinction between freedom and the
body that is a bit less blurry, and it is here that I now turn.

Pirsig and The Implicated Body
Pirsig relies on more than one theme in presenting arguments about technology
and its implications for the body. For example, the theme of the cross-country motorcycle
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trip, which I would call the “story” theme, functions to inform Pirsig’s discussion of
Quality by presenting the reader with various metaphors and analogies. This second
theme, the intellectual framework Pirsig develops regarding the nature of Quality, is
enriched by the way the first theme is structured, and vice-versa. The following analysis
will probe Pirsig’s use of one theme to inform another, and how the body is implicated in
both.44 I will then proceed into a discussion of Pirsig’s reflections about the nature of
Quality, where the body is concerned. Finally, I will devote a specific section to Pirsig’s
discussion of gumption, as this has significant implications for the body.
Themes, metaphor, and analogy
The language used in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance reveals
interesting connections between the “body” and the main focus of Pirsig’s work...the
intellectual framework he sets forth. Specifically, Pirsig utilizes metaphor and/or analogy
to invoke the body in one theme of the book - that of the cross-country motorcycle trip
with his son. The use of metaphor and analogy is done so in such a way as to implicate
the body in his more theoretical discussion of how technology can be reconciled with
modem society. An interesting observation is that while Pirsig argues that one must
engage the body in one’s pursuit of Quality, he also makes use of several body references
and physical terms in connecting the story theme to this discussion of Quality. Examples
of this will be illustrated through some of the upcoming passages.
During the story theme of the text Pirsig observes that things are seen on a
motorcycle in a way that is completely different from being in a car. In a car the individual
has a sense of being enclosed, and this sense contributes to a feeling that one is a passive

102

observer in which scenes occur and disappear almost in a kind of frame. The cyclist
experiences no such frame, Pirsig argues, and the feeling of being completely in contact
with it all is ever-present. Pirsig notes: You’re in the scene, not just watching it anymore,
and the sense of presence is overwhelming” (p. 4). This passage appears early in the text,
and one may wonder how this is at all connected with the body and/or Quality.
Pirsig is advocating very early that a distinction exists between those individuals
who discover and engage Quality and those who do not. The individual behind the wheel
of a car is not engaging the scene, while the cyclist is. This sets up later discussion in the
text which proposes that to pursue Quality, one must engage an object, craft, job...etc. in
similar fashion. The individual who is on the path toward Quality will feel like s/he is
experiencing an object or craft, and that this experience is never removed from immediate
consciousness. The body comes into play only implicitly here, for to pursue Quality,
Pirsig argues that the body must be engaged both physically and mentally f
In another early passage, Pirsig mentions that he and his son are traveling across
the country with some friends, and that secondary roads are preferred over main highways
and freeways. Pirsig adds that while they strive to make good time, the emphasis ought to
be placed on the term good rather than time. He argues that when this shift in emphasis is
made, one’s entire approach changes. For example, while twisting hilly roads are long in
terms of time, they are also much more enjoyable on the cycle than stretches of flat, barren
land.
Pirsig is offering illustrations about the process of riding the cycle and vacationing,
but more is going on here. The argument is made that when riding, an emphasis ought to
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be placed on the good in making good time. While certain stretches of land may seem
more time consuming, they are worth it if they are enjoyable. The same will be argued
about dealing with technology and pursuing Quality in the other theme to Pirsig’s text, the
intellectual framework he develops. The implication is that the pursuit of Quality might be
a lengthy one, such as with maintaining one’s motorcycle, but it is also much more
enriching and enjoyable if one has an understanding for Quality. Part of what makes
motorcycle maintenance a lengthy process is the amount of detail involved in caring for
the cycle and the patience one must have in doing so. Again, the body is only implicitly
present in this discussion, as the connection between the pursuit of Quality and proper
engagement of the body is a necessary one to recall. This will receive more detailed
attention shortly.
Pirsig mentions that one character, “Sylvia,” was almost flown out to Montana
instead of cycling out with the rest of the characters in the story. Pirsig asserts that this
would have been a mistake, for arriving in the Rocky Mountains by plane would be to see
them in an entirely different way than after days of hard travel on the motorcycle. It is
argued that the airplane traveler would view the Rockies as “pretty scenery,” while the
cyclist looks upon them as “a goal, a promised land” (p. 18). Though Pirsig doesn’t
explicitly mention it, the assumption is given that the airplane traveler would not possess
the appreciation for the Rocky Mountains that the cyclist would.
Once again, an analogy is being drawn between riding the motorcycle across
country (story theme) and the pursuit of Quality (reflective theme, intellectual framework).
Pirsig implies that individuals who pursue Quality in their activities have to work harder
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and put in more time, but end up possessing a greater appreciation for the nature of that
activity, object, job...etc. This will likely be at least in part a result of the type of
relationship the individual forges with his or her “pursuit.” Recall prior discussion that
<

the individual that eliminates subject-object dualisms and considers himself or herself to be
in a sort of relationship with that “pursuit” will feel as though an investment has been
made in it, and this allows for a greater feeling of appreciation for it. While the preceding
passages have served to illustrate the connection Pirsig makes between multiple themes in
the text, the body has only implicitly been linked to them —as a significant component of
Quality. However, the following passages serve to illustrate not only this continued
implicit notion of the body vis-a-vis Quality, but also an employment of the body in
physical motion as a means to connect the story theme to Pirsig’s reflective theme.
Essentially, the body appears at both ends o f the connection Pirsig attempts to create
between the two themes. Invoking the body in the story theme o f the text allows Pirsig to
create emphasis on the body in his more reflective discussion about the needfor
individuals to pursue Quality.
One metaphor and subsequent analogy that Pirsig draws upon is that of the
mountain. It is here that one can begin to see more of an employment of the body concept
at both ends of the connection Pirsig is attempting to make. One of the best indicators
that the metaphor of the mountain serves to implicate both the body and the pursuit of
Quality in a technological society is the following passage:
Mountains like these and travelers in the mountains and the events
that happen here are found not only in Zen literature but in the tales o f
every major religion. The allegory o f a physical mountain for a spiritual
one that stands between each soul and its goal is an easy and natural
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one to make. Like those in the valley behind us, most people stand
in sight of the spiritual mountains all their lives and never enter them. (p. 167)

The final sentence of this passage suggests that in general most people stay at the “valley”
level; that is, they don’t make intellectual or spiritual pursuits of any real significance.
Specifically, it is implied that most people don’t take the time to pursue Quality in their
everyday lives. As I’ve discussed, striving for Quality means eliminating subject-object
dualisms, and this requires more effort on the part of the individual. Using the example of
motorcycle maintenance, it requires taking the time to learn about the machine (something
most people are not willing to do). Additionally, it requires being methodical and patient
in one’s upkeep of the cycle. The “working relationship” between individual and cycle
must be established. While traversing a mountain “physically” gets related to the kind of
effort most people put into their endeavors, it is the “spiritual” mountain most need to
confront if Quality is to be achieved.
In the midst of climbing the mountain, Pirsig informs that reader that a short rest is
needed, and this is due to the weight of the backpacks. He adds: “There’s a negative
reaction to all the weight. As we go on though, it’ll become more natural” (p. 174). The
climber of the mountain is having to adjust to the weight of the pack much in the same
way individuals who first discover and seek to pursue Quality have to adjust becoming
more observant, patient, diligent, and skilled. By declaring that the weight of the pack will
become more natural, it can be implied that individuals will eventually accustom
themselves to the Quality process. For example, an individual like the character “John,”
who regards technology from a romantic perspective and does not care to explore the
underlying form of his cycle, would feel awkward at first if he began to maintain his own
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cycle and look at it from a classic perspective. However, eventually he would come to
appreciate this process and treat it as “natural.”
The mountain metaphor appears again a few pages later:
You climb the mountain in an equilibrium between restlessness and
exhaustion. Then, when you’re no longer thinking ahead, each footstep isn’t
just a means to an end but a unique event in itself. This leaf has jagged edges.
This rock looks loose To live only for some future goal is shallow. It’s the
sides o f the mountain which sustain life, not the top. Here’s where things
grow. (p. 183)

The act of climbing a mountain and the process involved (pushing the body, asserting
effort) is described, but there is more going on here. Pirsig suggests that when you no
longer only have your eye on the “ends,” but instead start to indulge in the “means” or
process, you escape the realm of shallowness and work toward what I would call
fulfillment. The “equilibrium” mentioned here can be translated over to the everyday
world of the individual, wherein s/he achieves a sort of harmony with what s/he is doing.
This is analogous to one’s job, hobbies, or in Pirsig’s case again, motorcycle maintenance.
Becoming familiar with the process of motorcycle maintenance, and not just with how it
rides or handles, is a “unique event in itself.” It allows one to appreciate the “sides of the
mountain.” With respect to technology, this is viewed as liberating for the individual. No
longer would one be at the mercy of how the machine chooses to function. Rather, should
an individual choose to explore the underlying form of the cycle, s/he would be able to
understand it better, and have more control over how s/he wants it to perform.
Conceivably, technology’s grip on the individual would begin to loosen. The
aforementioned passage provides the reader a glimpse into how such an “equilibrium” gets
applied.
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The final sentence of the passage, “Here’s where things grow,” has an organic
appeal to it, and this gets related to the body in a later passage in which Pirsig is no longer
within the “story,” but is now adding to his intellectual framework (the two seesaw back
and forth throughout the text):
In pursuit o f this ghost he (Phaedrus) went on to wider meanings o f Quality
which drew him further and further to his end...I’ve no intention o f going
on to that end...He just passed through this territory...I intend to stay and
cultivate it and see if I can get something to grow A real understanding o f
Quality doesn’t just serve the System, or even beat it or even escape it. A real
understanding o f Quality captures the System, tames it, and puts it to work for
one’s own use... (p. 200)

Terms like cultivate and captures pose images of the body in action. To cultivate an area
of discussion and to see if one can “...get something to grow” present agricultural
metaphors regarding a physical body at work on a farm or in a garden. Pirsig is explaining
that he wants to explore the realm of Quality with respect to everyday living - most
specifically, living in a technological world. In doing so, he presents powerful imagery of
the body at work. Additionally, the term captures in almost any context allows for the
image of a set of hands reaching out to grab something, then clutching it to a point where
it cannot escape. Pirsig, in trying to discuss how Quality can lead to liberation within a
technological society, presents powerful imagery not o f the body as static, but as
dynamic in carrying out an action.
One final passage within the Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance reveals in
powerful fashion the manner in which the mountain serves as a metaphor for the pursuit of
Quality, and with respect to the body:
We come to a rough grade and it changes to two breaths per step. At one bank
it goes to four breaths per step. Huge steps, almost vertical The aspen
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staves come in handy now the packs make you top-heavy and the sticks are
good insurance against toppling over. You plant one foot, plant the staff, then
SWING on it, up, and take three breaths, then plant the next foot, plant the
staff and SWING up... (p. 199)

The speaker is engaged in a steep, physical climb up the mountain. It is somewhat
exhausting, and he is forced to take longer breaths. By the end of the passage, he is
describing the methodical nature of the climb. “You plant one foot, plant the staff, then
SWING on it, up, and take three breaths, then plant the next foot...” The fact that three
breaths are needed between each step suggests how methodical and patient the climber
needs to be in this situation. This is analogous to Pirsig’s explication of the pursuit of
Quality in the everyday world. In fact, the passage is a prime example of the pursuit itself.
The individual needs to be methodical and patient when engaging anything if s/he wants to
be doing it properly. Things might seem slow and time-consuming, but Pirsig would
argue that there is nothing wrong with this. In fact, this is what getting at the process of
things entails. Essentially, this is necessary for the achievement of both liberation and
fulfillment in modern-day society. This is presented as the method for coping. The
preceding passage serves as a sort of mini-illustration to the reader for how to apply it.
Pirsig relies on one theme, that of the cross-country motorcycle trip story, to shed
light on the more theoretical theme that is his reflections about the nature of Quality. He
does so in different ways, though. In some instances the body is only subtly implied, as it
can never be far removed from what it means to pursue Quality. Thus, it is here that
Pirsig implicates it at only one end of the link he attempts to make between themes. Other
instances exist where Pirsig implicates it at both ends of the connection drawn. In an
effort to explicate the former instances better, I will turn to a discussion of what I’ve made
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generalizations about throughout this thesis thus far: Pirsig’s more theoretical comments
about the significance of the body to the Quality process. This will include a later
discussion of the body and gumption, which is a key component to Pirsig’s development
of the concept Quality.
Reflections invoking the body
Pirsig argues that engaging the body in the pursuit of Quality entails not only
physical engagement, but mental engagement as well. One example he offers is the case
o f the auto or cycle mechanic. Pirsig asserts that untrained observers often perceive the
mechanic’s work largely to be made up of physical labor. However, this is only a small
part of the mechanic’s job. The physical labor exerted by the mechanic actually works in
concert with the type of careful observation and precise thinking that constitute mental
engagement. This of course carries with it the assumption that the mechanic adopts a
craftsmanlike approach to work. Pirsig suggests that if one were to observe the
expression of a novice workman and compare it to that of a craftsman whose work is
known to be excellent, the difference would be visible. For example, the craftsman never
proceeds in a straight line. Rather, decisions are made as the work unfolds. For this
reason, Pirsig suggests that the craftsman will be absorbed and attentive to what s/he is
doing without deliberately contriving this. Essentially, the motions of the craftsman will
be in a kind of harmony with, in this case, the machine.
The larger point Pirsig attempts to drive home here is that the divorce of art from
technology is unnatural. That is, individuals now see technology as being distant and
removed from the artistic process. Pirsig would advocate that technology, and the

110

engagement of technology, is as much an artistic process as painting and songwriting.
Pirsig ponders at one point how strange it is that old, obsolete buildings and the
technology of fifty and a hundred years ago always appears to look better than its modem
successors. Implied here is that what prevailed in the past was a more craftsmanlike
approach to engaging technology. This approach had as its end Quality. Thus, a
constmction worker who was assigned to help construct a building engaged his or her
body in such a way as to pursue Quality. The result would be a building, plant, or mill
that stands the test of time because it is done right. Pirsig communicates this feeling when
he contemplates this older technology and compares it with newer forms of technology
that do not seem to exude such craftsmanship.46
Pirsig utilizes another metaphor, that of the stream, in arguing that individuals are
searching for additional fulfillment in the wake of having vital necessities such as food,
clothing and shelter provided for (thanks in part to technology):
Now the stream o f our common consciousness seems to be obliterating its own
banks, losing its central direction and purpose...and to no particular purpose
other than the wasteful fulfillment o f its own internal momentum. Some
channel deepening seems called for. (p. 7)

The stream is connected to the collective mindset of modem society, and it is argued that
individuals are caught up in a world of unfulfillment even though something more is
desired. Whereas for many the vital needs of food, clothing and shelter are no longer a
challenge to procure, what remains are feelings of emptiness and futility that individuals
appear to be experiencing. Pirsig asserts that the result of this is a lack of recognition
where Quality is concerned. The “channel deepening” that seems necessary is implied to
be a new approach to engaging technology. This approach has as its centerpiece the
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concept of Quality, and individuals must exert themselves physically and mentally in
pursuing it if they are to attain sufficient levels of fulfillment.
An incident Pirsig encounters while on the road serves to illustrate the argument
that art and technology should not be separated. Pirsig has to stop into a small welder’s
shop to have a chain guard fixed for his cycle. He explains the problem to the welder, an
older gentleman, and the welder proceeds to fix the chain guard in a more intricate and
delicate manner than Pirsig admits he ever could. Pirsig is forced to ask himself: “Who
appreciates work like this anymore?” (p. 321). The way in which the scene is set up and
played out suggests that the welder is perceived by Pirsig to be a craftsman, one who
engages his work in such as a way as to pursue Quality. The end result is a job done right,
even better than Pirsig confesses he could do. In the following section, I will examine a
key concept to Pirsig’s reflections about Quality: gumption.
Gumption and the body
Pirsig characterizes gumption as being what happens to the individual who
connects with Quality. This connection does not necessarily mean Quality is already
achieved. It could simply mean that an understanding of Quality has been acquired. Pirsig
observes that individuals who return from a peaceful vacation, say a long fishing trip, seem
to be filled with gumption. He argues that when he repairs his motorcycle, an adequate
supply of gumption is necessary at the start, for it is the “psychic gasoline” that keeps the
him going.
Pirsig suggests that just as easily as the physical and mental capacities of an
individual can be working together because of gumption, a lack of it can lead to
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frustration, anger, and impatience. Gumption is an essential component to the Quality
process, and its presence or absence will be visible in the type o f physical and mental
effort exuded by the individual. Pirsig illustrates:
Throughout the process o f fixing the machine things always come up, lowquality things, from a dusted knuckle to an accidentally ruined “irreplaceable”
assembly. These drain off gumption, destroy enthusiasm and leave you so
discouraged you want to forget the whole business. I call these things
“gumption traps.” (p. 274)

Pirsig asserts that gumption traps, if they do not leave the individual wanting to drop the
entire Quality pursuit, will lead to improper bodily engagement for the individual. That is,
the individual will engage his or her body physically and mentally in such a way that
anything but Quality will be the outcome.
This point receives further development later, as gumption traps are isolated into
two main types: setbacks and hang-ups. During setbacks, the individual is proposed to be
thrown off the path to Quality by external conditions. Utilizing Pirsig’s example of
motorcycle maintenance, the individual might encounter parts trouble, wherein a certain
part might be needed that is not already present. Thus, the individual has to search the
city for a mechanic or parts store that carries the part in question. This can lead to
frustration, and the implied message is that when the individual returns to his cycle to
repair it, the potential exists for a lower Quality experience regarding that pursuit.47 The
body is implicated at the level of improper physical and mental engagement in repairing the
cycle.
The second type of gumption trap —hang-ups -- poses even greater implications
for the body. This type of trap is more a result of the internal conditions of the individual,
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and Pirsig classifies these into three types: 1) value traps, such as ego, anxiety, boredom
and impatience; 2) truth traps, where the individual assumes for example that “yes’ or
“no” is the answer to a question, rather than acknowledging the possibility of “maybe” or
even “there is no answer at this time”; and 3) muscle traps, such as working in bad
surroundings, using bad tools, or what Pirsig calls “muscular insensitivity.”
The first and third types of hang-ups have the greatest implications for the body.
For example, value traps like an over-sized ego and feelings of anxiety, boredom and/or
patience will in all likelihood result in an improper mental engagement of the body. This
translates into poor physical performance, and the end result is a low-Quality experience
for the individual. If an individual’s ego gets in the way of accepting new forms of
thought where the cycle is concerned, this blockage will function as a deterrent to Quality.
Similarly, feelings of boredom, anxiety, impatience and even fatigue create blockage, and
it will be more difficult for the individual to experience Quality.
In the story theme of the text, Pirsig illustrates how fatigue and impatience
contribute to a low-Quality experience. Exhausted after a long day of traveling, the four
characters (Pirsig, Chris, John and Sylvia) try to set up camp and prepare food. Their
bodies are physically tired, and perceiving only one-half hour of remaining daylight leads
to feelings of impatience where setting up camp is concerned. They try to rush through
the process, but are too tired to do anything effectively. In the end they are just glad to
get to sleep.48
Regarding muscle traps, if an individual buys ineffective or poorly constructed
tools and turns up the volume of the radio while trying to repair a cycle, the end result will
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once again be a lower Quality experience than what could be achieved.49 Both
concentration and performance will be what suffers. For this reason, it is imperative that
an individual be comfortable with one’s tools, one’s knowledge of those tools, and one’s
surroundings. Pirsig also asserts that muscular insensitivity can be a gumption trap. This
can best be characterized as a lack of ability to perform very precise tasks at the level of
physical engagement. For example, in maintaining the cycle, Pirsig speaks of certain tools
which he refers to as precision instruments. These tools are meant to be applied to
extremely intricate components of the cycle (often very expensive components, as well).
If an individual has “shaky hands,” s/he will probably be forced to recognize the gumption
trap Pirsig refers to as muscular insensitivity.50
Where muscular insensitivity largely entails a physical engagement of the body, the
notion of stuckness appears to deal more with mental engagement. It is certain though,
with stuckness and other gumption-related concepts, that proper or improper mental
engagement o f the body will directly motivate proper or improper physical engagement.
Pirsig suggests:
Stuckness shouldn’t be avoided. It’s the psychic predecessor o f all real
understanding. An egoless acceptance o f stuckness is a key to an under
standing o f all Quality, in mechanical work as in other endeavors, (p. 257)

Pirsig places a positive spin on the idea of being stuck in one’s pursuit. An implicit
suggestion is that if one possesses gumption, stuckness will not prevail for long. The
individual, provided s/he avoids the gumption trap of an over-sized ego, will eventually
slip out of this state of stuckness and back on the path to Quality.
Pirsig explicates this discussion by detailing Chris’ trouble with writing a letter to
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his mother. Chris does not know where to begin, and Pirsig informs him that getting stuck
is common. It usually occurs when one is trying to think of (or do) too many things at
once. Rather than trying to figure out what to say and what to sayfirst, Pirsig advises
Chris to sort out all of the things he wants to say to his mother in the letter. This is
analogous to Pirsig’s discussion of the motorcycle. For example, in assembling or taking
apart the cycle, Pirsig recommends keeping specific track of the order things are done.
This type of organization will ensure that the individual accomplishes everything s/he
wants, and that each thing gets accomplished in a specific order. Doing this not only
ensures that one will sustain present levels of gumption, but that specific gumption traps
will also be avoided.
Pirsig argues that individuals who possess gumption reveal a type of inner
quietness and peace of mind. This peace of mind paves the way to Quality, part of
acquiring it means recognizing the various levels at which it occurs. For example, physical
quietness is a necessary component to peace of mind. This entails working at a level of
quietness that promotes concentration and attentiveness to one’s endeavor, and Pirsig
argues this to be the easiest to achieve. Mental quietness occurs when one has no
wondering thoughts at all. Related to this is value quietness, where one performs the acts
of his pursuit without any wondering desires at all. Pirsig argues this type of quietness to
be the most difficult to achieve. The implication is that if one is able to mentally engage
the body in this fashion, then the type of physical application that results from this will
almost certainly lead one to Quality.
I have addressed the implicated body in Pirsig’s discussion of technology. Pirsig
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asserts that technology can be reconciled with modem society as long as individuals re
assess their own values in a way that both recognizes and pursues Quality. The body is
the “vehicle” through which such effort is exerted. Physical and mental engagement are
necessary to arrive at Quality.
In summarizing:
o

Pirsig uses the story theme in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance to
inform the more reflective theme about the nature of Quality. In doing so, the
body is implicated at the more subtle level of its connection to Quality.

o

Additionally, there are instances in which Pirsig invokes the body in a physical way
by presenting it in the story theme, but also connecting it to his more theoretical
discussion about Quality. At times, the image conjured is that of a body in motion,
either climbing a mountain or at work in a garden.

0

Pirsig reflects on technology and its implications for the body, and one of the more
focal ways this is done appears in his discussion of gumption. Gumption entails
both physical and mental engagment of the body, and avoiding gumption
“traps”can lead to Quality.

1 will now compare and contrast the ways Pirsig and Kaczynski implicate the body in their
overall discussions.

Kaczynski. Pirsig. and The Implicated Body
One can recall Kaczynski’s argument that individuals must first break free from
technology and modem society before an adequate engagement of the body can occur.
Once this type of freedom is procured individuals will be able to engage the body as
Kaczynski argues it ought to be engaged. That is, individuals will exert their bodies both
physically and mentally in pursuing real goals (as opposed to surrogate activities).
Essentially, the need for the power process will be served, according to Kaczynski.

117

Because individuals will be free from technology, the body will be engaged properly and,
subsequently, increased levels of freedom and fulfillment will prevail. Kaczynski invokes
the body as an end, where a necessary precursor to its proper engagement is the
abolition o f the modern technological system. This differs from the ways Pirsig implicates
the body.
Pirsig suggests that what is first needed in the quest for freedom and fulfillment is
a proper physical and mental engagement of the body. This can be achieved alongside
technology and within modem society, as long as individuals re-assess their values to
include an understanding and pursuit of Quality. If this is done, individuals will no longer
feel frustrated by and alienated from technology. Rather, the opposite will prevail. Pirsig
argues that the body is the means by which individuals can procure sufficient levels o f
freedom, fulfillment and purpose. This can only be accomplished, though, if individuals
discover Quality and pursue it in their jobs, hobbies, and everyday tasks. Once Quality is
recognized, the individual will use his or her body to physically and mentally pursue it in
the aforementioned endeavors. Thus, where Kaczynski connects the body to the power
process, Pirsig connects it to Quality. Pirsig and Kaczynski implicate the body at different
levels of their overall argument, but discussing the body differently can also be attributed
to the stylistic differences that exist between the Manifesto and Zen and the Art of
Motorcycle Maintenance.
Kaczynski‘s argumentative and rationalistic approach to the Manifesto leaves him
discussing the body merely as it should be engaged (and how this is not the case in modem
society). That is, individuals have a need for the power process, but that need can only be
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served if the individual breaks free from modem industrial-technological society. Part of
the reason Kaczynski discusses the body predominantly in this manner only is that he
presents an argument that is not multi-themed. Pirsig, however, incorporates multiple
themes in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. The body receives attention not
only in his theoretical and reflective theme, but in the story theme as well. The reader of
the text is presented with multi-leveled images of the body. One potential result of this is
a perception that the body is more significant to Pirsig’s argument than it is to
Kaczynski’s. I argue that this conclusion would be misleading, for in referring back to the
diagram of both authors’ overall argument, it becomes evident that the body is treated as
one step in the “recommendations” of both Pirsig and Kaczynski. It is just that for Pirsig
the body crosses over from one theme into another.
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION

In the following chapter I will offer conclusions about the two texts, re-addressing
the methods utilized in this thesis and their implications. Included in this will be a brief
return to the research questions posed in chapter one. Additionally, I will return to the
level of theory, drawing especially on Borgmann’s (1984) work (though others, as well) in
order to provide critical, philosophical insight into the ways Pirsig and Kaczynski discuss
freedom and the body alongside technology. Finally, I will broaden my lens to the more
general topic of technology and society, offering conclusions about what this work can
contribute to its overall discussion.

The Two Texts
At the close o f chapter one, the following research questions were posed:
RQ1: In what ways do Kaczynski and Pirsig discuss the issue o f technology with
respect to society?
RQ2: How are Kaczynski and Pirsig similar and different in the ways they
discuss technology with respect to society?

It can now be seen that Kaczynski and Pirsig present similar arguments regarding the
impact technology has upon members of modem society (e.g., potential feelings of
frustration, unfulfillment, insecurity, etc.). At the level of assessment, though, the two
authors proceed in entirely different directions for how individuals ought to cope with
technology. Freedom and the body are key concepts appealed to by Kaczynski and Pirsig.
Where Kaczynski asserts that individuals must break free from technology and the
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structure of modem society in order to properly experience the body (an subsequently,
increased levels of freedom), Pirsig argues that technology can be reconciled with modem
society if the individual first engages one’s body both physically and mentally in the pursuit
of Quality. The result of this will be increased feelings of freedom, which take the form of
peace of mind, control, security, creativity and power, to name a few primary ones.
Essentially, Kaczynski advocates a revolution against technology, and Pirsig advocates
reform within technology. This reform is very much reliant upon the individual’s re
assessment of his or her values to include a recognition and pursuit of Quality.
The phenomenon of technology is an expansive subject for anyone to approach.
Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance and the Manifesto are examples of two texts
which address the phenomenon as a whole, rather than with respect to one or more
specific innovations. Conducting a comparative analysis o f two texts which address
technology has allowedfor a more comprehensive interpretation o f the phenomenon,
particularly when it is observed that similar notions (e.g., freedom and the body) are
implicated in both. Thus, both texts functioned to shed light on the phenomenon of
technology in ways I had hoped they would, and observing discussions of freedom and the
body allowed for an illumination of the primary means through which such discussion
occurred.
McGee’s (1980) concept of the ideograph was employed to examine <freedom> as
it appears in the Manifesto and Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. The
ideographic analysis of freedom is, as Sillars (1991) would put it, a “value analysis.”
Appealing to values is a popular move to make these days, it seems. Indeed, Cheney (in
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press) observes that values are “all the rage in today’s organizations,” but the stress on
values manifests itself in many different ways. The ambiguities surrounding important
value terms are interpretive resources, sources of emotional allegiance, and bases for
persuasion. This thesis examined the value of freedom as it appeared not in organizational
mission statements or political speeches, but in discussion about the phenomenon of
technology with respect to modem society. This has significant implications.
First, it is significant that both texts connect the concept of freedom to a discussion
of technology. Kaczynski and Pirsig wind up with different recommendations for how we
as a society ought to respond to the perceived restrictions of freedom that technology
presents the individual, but the fact remains that both authors appeal to this concept when
discussing technology. Tapping into this particular value appears to be a necessary move
to make when discussing and evaluating technology as a phenomenon, either explicitly (as
in the Manifesto^ or more implicitly (as in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance!.
In the latter case, an appeal will be made to related concepts, such as security, peace of
mind, power, and/or their antitheses.
It has been observed that ambiguities exist in both texts, and for the most part
these ambiguities are a result of the authors’ lack of clarity when presenting a particular
argument. However, in appealing to freedom, a different sort of ambiguity emerges. This
type of ambiguity functions almost as an enthymeme for the reader of these texts. An
enthymeme is the building block of deductive approaches to persuasion, according to
Aristotle (1954). Specifically, the enthymeme involves an argument that explicitly or
implicitly draws upon value or factual premises already held by an audience. That is, the
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enthymeme utilizes something the audience already holds as a fulcrum for persuasion.
Kaczynski invokes the concept freedom not only by using related terms such as
“autonomy,” but also by frequently implying that individuals experience restricted levels of
freedom in modem society. In this case, Kaczynski does not actually use the term
“freedom” itself. Pirsig presents an even clearer example of this by only invoking freedom
at an implicit level. He relies instead on notions of security, peace of mind, and control
(among others), as well as their antitheses, in appealing to freedom. By creating ambiguity
in appealing to freedom, ambiguity itself appears to be a strategic appeal. Readers of
these texts are drawn into recognizing freedom as a crucial factor in the overall arguments
concerning technology and society. If the argument is accepted, the persuasiveness of the
text is enhanced, since the reader has a hand in creating the link to freedom.51 Ambiguity
in value-oriented discourse has the potential to be very powerful, particularly in cases such
as this, where the value in question is a dominant, highly-recognized one which gets
invoked by discussing other related (though subordinate) values (e.g., security, peace of
mind, autonomy, control, etc.). Indeed, ambiguity is an inherent dimension of language,
and tuning into those areas which possess it can reveal interesting findings (Burke, 1950).
In fact, as Cheney (in press) observes, often the more important an idea is, the more
abstract its form will be. Its very abstractness can serve as a strategic advantage in
practical contexts. Consequently, a wider range of possibilities will exist for pragmatic as
well as ideological implications under the umbrella of, say, “freedom,” “democracy,”
“efficiency,” etc. (Cheney, in press).
A second significant implication is that technology will in all likelihood receive
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greater critical examination the more its role increases in the daily lives of individuals. It
will become even more necessary to isolate particular values that come to the surface in
these examinations. Will value shifts occur in the way technology is critically examined?
Will specific values reappear or disappear altogether in future discussions of the
phenomenon? These are relevant questions that value analyses in general and ideographic
analyses specifically can probe when inquiring about the nature of technology.
The body was raised to a level of analysis, as I examined what I refer to as the
“implicated body” in both texts. Conducting what I consider to be a “body-centered
analysis” is not a common move to make. However, some brands of criticism do
emphasize the “place’ of the body in discourse (e.g., Foucault, 1978). More often than
not the body is invoked through other methods of examining discourse. For example, I
choose to examine the body and metaphor in addressing Pirsig’s transition from one theme
to another in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. I also discussed the
Manifesto’s employment of the “infected collective body” metaphor in arguing that
genetic engineering could lead to increased numbers of genes that pose tendencies toward
various diseases. Of course, the body is invoked in ways other than metaphorical ones, as
more direct and explicit discussions of it are undertaken by Pirsig and Kaczynski.
Because of the emphasis placed on the body by both authors, I argue that it is a worthy
focus o f inquiry. Thus, rather than conduct a metaphor analysis that relied partly on the
body, a “body analysis” that revealed occasional usage of metaphor was carried out.
This may become more of a trend in the future, particularly for the critic who
wishes to explore the phenomenon of technology. Of course, one need not look only to
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technology for discussion of the body. In modem society, bodily image is promoted more
and more. Everywhere we turn we are confronted with appeals to this diet supplement,
that muscle-building protein shake, this particular piece of exercise equipment, that ideal
bodily figure, just to name a few images. Indeed, a Foucauldian interpretation of the body
would not be an inaccurate one here. Foucault (1977; 1978) asserts that society
disciplines individuals to discipline their bodies in order to adhere to social expectations.
Implicit in Marcuse’s (1968) discussion is that, in a world where technology contributes to
providing society with vital needs, and individuals are left to seek fulfillment by satisfying
“non-necessary” needs, the body is engaged in a more insignificant manner. Everdeveloping technology will presumably continue to reinforce this trend. Body-centered
criticism may be relied upon to a greater extent in situations where critics seek to
incorporate multiple forms of analyses, such as narrative, dramatistic, metaphorical, and/or
value analysis, under the larger “corpus” that is the body.
Both Pirsig and Kaczynski appeal to notions of freedom and the body in their
discussions of technology and society. They do this despite the fact that Pirsig argues that
technology is reconcilable within modem society and Kaczynski argues that technology
must be abolished. This is also the case in spite of recognizable stylistic differences
between the two texts. It can therefore be argued that notions o f freedom and the body
are significant concepts to the examination o f technology and society. Drawing on
Borgmann’s (1984) work to illuminate potential shortcomings of both texts will also
reveal, in what follows, that the body and freedom are pivotal to a discussion of
technology, even if one or both concepts appears implicitly.52 The critic that examines

125

texts discussing technology would be well-served by investigating the forms that these
concepts take in such discussion.
Perhaps even more significant than the fact that these two concepts appear in a
discussion about technology is that they appear in a way that makes it difficult to
distinguish them. Pirsig’s employment of multiple themes seems to make the distinction
between freedom and the body a bit clearer, but for the most part these concepts are as
much interwoven as they are separate. This connection that exists may not be all that
surprising, given the nature of the discussion. Reflecting on technology as a phenomenon
almost certainly requires the scholar to examine its effects at the level of the individual.
Once this is undertaken, appealing to concepts such as freedom and the body are appeals
to individual concerns where technology is concerned. Questions such as: Will technology
make greater or fewer demands on my body, physically and mentally? and What does
technology mean for my individual freedom? are ones which demand answers. At a more
theoretical level, the question: Will technology lead me to conceptualizations o f my body
and the nature offreedom that are different from past conceptualizations? seems relevant
and timely.

Theory Redux
It is the promise o f technology that has both fueled and
disguised the gigantic transformative endeavors that have
given our time its character. (Borgmann, p. 35)

Both Pirsig and Kaczynski accurately detect that problems exist with how
individuals cope with technology and modem society. Both authors suggest that levels of
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freedom and fulfillment are perceived to suffer, either at the hands of the entire
technological system (in Kaczynski’s case) or from the way individuals engage technology
(in Pirsig’s case). Pirsig and Kaczynski are correct in arguing that freedom and the body
are core concepts in addressing technology’s impact on the individual. Both authors do
good work illuminating these concepts, despite the fact that freedom and the body appear
in different areas and in different ways in their overall arguments.53 However, in
proposing ways for how we as a society ought to respond to issues such as freedom and
fulfillment where technology is implicated, both authors fall short in their analyses.
Borgmann’s (1984) discussion of technology serves to illuminate the shortcomings
of both Kaczynski and Pirsig. Kaczynski suggests that the body cannot be engaged
properly in modem society. This is so because the power process cannot be experienced
in a significant way. Individuals must revolt against and break free from the current
technological structure, which Kaczynski argues to be the source of restricted levels of
freedom, increased feelings of frustration and purposelessness, and surrogate activities. In
many ways Kaczynski articulates ideas proposed by Ellul (1964) and Marcuse (1968 ).
Recall that these philosophers both assert that freedom is frequently restricted in modem
technological society (e.g., by providing us with “more” to be accountable to, such as
increasing means of communication). Additionally, superficial needs are foregrounded as
a result of having vital needs provided for without the exertion of serious effort. For
example, individuals who do not directly provide for their own vital needs more often than
not take up hobbies or direct their efforts toward the acquisition of material goods.
Kaczynski would suggest that these superficial needs are pursued through surrogate
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activities. The end result of this is a body that is not engaged properly, as well as
continued restrictions placed on individual freedom.
Borgmann responds to this issue by arguing that the body can be engaged properly
and individuals can experience sufficient levels of freedom and fulfillment in modem
society. What is advocated is not a revolution against technology per se, but a shift in the
way technology is perceived and embraced. Borgmann proposes that individuals ought to
place the phenomenon of technology in the background of their daily lives rather than
foregrounding it. That is, rather than relying on technology to such a point that it
contributes to defining oneself, the individual ought to place it in such a role that it merely
complements one’s life.
Borgmann develops the concept of the device paradigm in explicating the ways
individuals can fall into the trap of foregrounding technology and experiencing perceived
feelings of unfulfillment. One example given is that of the central heating plant. While
heat used to be something individuals had to exert serious effort to procure, today it is
acquired for many by simply adjusting a thermostat. One result of this is that individuals
no longer have to exert serious effort in order to secure this necessary need. Thus, the
physical effort that used to be applied toward producing heat, often through a woodstove,
is either channeled elsewhere or left in a static state. The device paradigm makes genuine
engagement virtually impossible. This leads to another result of the device paradigm —
that individuals feel removed from that which provides for them. A heating plant can be
perceived as an ominous, obscure entity, one which is responsible for the production of a
crucial product. The experience of having such a need provided by a largely mysterious
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entity can be an unsettling one for the individual. This speaks to Kaczynski’s claim that
individuals feel their lives are in the hands of mysterious forces or people, and that it is
necessary to remove oneself from technology in order to arrive at genuine freedom and
fulfillment.
Borgmann suggests that the focal practice is the answer in sustaining levels of
freedom and fulfillment, while at the same time engaging the body properly. Focal
practices allow the individual to place the phenomenon of technology in the background of
daily life. When this is accomplished, things like central heating plants take on a more
positive meaning in the lives of individuals. They are seen for what they are —innovations
that improve the quality of everyday life. In articulating the nature of the focal practice,
Borgmann asserts:
A focal practice, generally, is the resolute and regular dedication to a focal
thing. It sponsors discipline and skill which are exercised in a unity of
achievement and enjoyment, o f mind and body. (p. 219)

One example of a focal practice given by Borgmann is running. For the runner, the road is
a focal thing. The runner makes demands on one’s skill in engaging the road. Skiing is
alsoa focal practice, and it is the slope that is a focal thing for the skier.One might
suggest that in fact technology is still foregrounded for these individuals, as they rely on
technology in order to engage these focal practices and things. Borgmann responds that
technological engagement is certainly present, as these activities depend on running shoes,
skis, ski boots, etc. However, these technological devices do not procure but mediate
focal engagement. The individual still must exert effort and apply skill toward these
practices, and engagement in the end comes with the road, the slope, etc.54 For
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Borgmann, focal things and practices can empower society to propose and potentially
enact a reform of technology, by first placing it in the background of daily life, and then
opening up public discussion of it as a phenomenon. This latter point will receive greater
attention later.
Kaczynski would suggest that discussion about reform within technology and.
finding fulfillment and freedom alongside technology neglects the imminent threat it poses
to human freedom. Recall previous arguments in the Manifesto which state that
technology will eventually acquire near complete control over human behavior, and that
the genetic engineering of our species will become an ever-present reality in the future.
Thus, not only would freedom suffer, but our bodies would also succumb to the pressures
of technology.
Borgmann proposes:
What is needed if we are to make the world truly and finally ours again is the
recovery o f a center and a standpoint from which one can tell what matters in
the world and what merely clutters it up. A focal concern is that center o f
orientation, (p. 225).

Not getting caught up in all of the “clutter” is the challenge for individuals. A focal
concern is one which recognizes focal things and practices, and if individuals can
recognize these, it is argued that much of the clutter will inevitably fade to the background
of daily life. For example, the world of commodities and consumption is a growing one,
but if individuals adopt more of a focal concern, less attention will be given to a pursuit of
commodities and a consumption of consumer goods. Focal things and practices take up
time through their engagement. A focal concern does more than illuminate focal things
and practices, though.
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Recognition of a focal concern must occur through a collective affirmation. That
is, by discussing issues openly and at local levels (as well as beyond), society must arrive
at a shared understanding of and commitment to a “certain kind of behavior or enterprise”
(p. 233). This collective affirmation will allow society to make decisions and accomplish
tasks that are beyond the capacities of single individuals. It is at this level that society will
be able to recognize trends that need to be either altered or reversed, such as with the kind
of potential Kaczynski argues genetic engineering exhibits.
Finally, Kaczynski appears to hurt his own argument when he claims that while
there is nothing to prevent us from marching out to the wilderness to live primitively, in
practice there is very little wild country left. It is wild nature that Kaczynski advocates,
within which he includes wild human nature. However, a tension exists in his overall
proposal that individuals must break free from technology and live primitively. With so
much land already developed to sustain modem society, how is it that Kaczynski can claim
individuals must revert back to a primitive lifestyle, when living primitively means living in
the wild if one wants to survive? Kaczynski readily admits that very little wild country
remains in America, yet he acknowledges that everyone must live close to nature in the
face of technological absence.55 Kaczynski proposes that a period of harsh adjustment will
be necessary, but this seems an understatement given the number of people who would be
all but forced to sacrifice their lives.
Borgmann suggests that living today in a physically sustainable way requires an
acceptance of technology, but that this acceptance is the sign of a new maturity. Thus, a
notion of wilderness no longer receives respect through its appeal to “wildness.” Rather,

131

the wilderness now moves us deeply in being so fragile and vulnerable, according to
Borgmann. Wild nature achieves new and positive significance within the technological
setting. A greater respect is what often accompanies this, and it is hoped that these
feelings translate into the kind of collective decision-making that promotes the well-being
of wild nature and the wilderness.
Borgmann would argue that Kaczynski’s notion o f the power process can in fact
be served in modern society, and in such a way that engages the body and produces
feelings o f freedom andfulfillment. What is required on the part o f the individual is a
shift in perspective. Technology must no longer be foregrounded, and focal practices are
ways that individuals can push technology to the background o f everyday life. Thus, if an
individual defines oneself as a runner, a writer, a musician and/or a painter first and
foremost, then technology takes on a new meaning. This new meaning, .where technology
is backgrounded, is an appreciation for what it has to offer the modem individual. Robert
Pirsig also argues that technology can be reconciled with modem society. However, his
overall argument is open for criticism when considered alongside Borgmann’s discussion
of technology and society.
Pirsig declares that it is his intention to ground out a discussion of Quality in the
everyday world. As Borgmann (1984) observes, though, Quality takes on such a broad
meaning that it loses much of its appeal. Cheney (in press) reveals that the concept
“Quality” is a vague one to begin with, one which is conceptualized by today’s
organizations not so much as a striving for higher standards of excellence, but merely a
direct response to perceived demands. The concept is at once compelling and almost
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meaningless in contemporary institutions, as no organizations will proclaim themselves to
be “anti-quality.” Quality has universal appeal, yet it means almost nothing. In fact,
technology itself has become tied up with the abstract value of progress and a pursuit of
“the good life,” today more than ever. This connection has permitted technology to be
deemed sacred by many.
Pirsig argues that physical and mental engagement of the body is the means by
which one arrives at Quality, once an understanding of it is achieved, and it is Quality
which will present the individual with increased feelings of fulfillment and freedom.
However, Pirsig argues that this concept can be applied even at the level of one’s own job.
He advocates a return to more of a craftsmanlike approach in one’s work. Borgmann
correctly points out that a “Zen-like” approach to all types of jobs simply is not the answer
anymore, for specialization has nudged its way into the workforce at many levels.
Traditional crafts, and craftsmanship, is what has suffered.. This was the case in the 1970s,
and is even more the case today. Borgmann recognizes that innovations can occur only by
displacing one form of tradition. Thus, technology had to displace and all but eliminate
traditional crafts. The lack of care that Pirsig argues is present in things like jobs is
perhaps only partly due to a change in values. The specialization of labor that has
developed is a consideration Pirsig does not address.
Quality does appear to possess some similarities to Borgmann’s discussion of the
focal practice. Borgmann discusses an “excellence” that is at the heart of many pursuits,
and Quality as Pirsig references it can be argued to translate to excellence. Both
discussions also tie nicely into Csikszentmihalyi’s (1990) concept of “flow,” which can be
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characterized as the immersion and enjoyment experienced by the individual who
voluntarily applies effort in engaging something difficult and worthwhile. However, the
concepts of Quality and the focal practice begin to diverge at the level of application.
Pirsig applies Quality not only to all types of jobs, but to endeavors that Borgmann would
not characterize as focal practices. Pirsig speaks of the need for engaging his motorcycle,
and he argues that he can pursue Quality in maintaining it. This is another example of
Pirsig applying the concept of Quality too broadly. In this case, technology is still in the
foreground for the individual. Not only is technology utilized in applying what is
perceived to be skill, it is the object that the skill is applied toward. This contrasts with
the skier, who allows technology to mediate engagement, but engagement is ultimately
with the slope.56 Thus, the skier must exert himself or herself mentally and physically in
order to maneuver the slope. Skill is a necessity. One could make the case that no real
skill is needed by Pirsig in maintaining the cycle, only a specific knowledge about its form
and function. For Pirsig, technology is implicated at the level of both focal practice and
focal thing (with the cycle being the focal thing).57 Again, technology is still in the
foreground in Pirsig’s case.
Another reason that a “foregrounded” technology is problematic is because it
reveals very little about an individual’s surrounding world. For example, Borgmann notes
that one might argue that a video game is a focal practice. However, video games usually
require a narrow range of skills, and they proceed in “utter indifference to the surrounding
world” (p. 215). Conversely, runners and skiers engage roads and mountains, and are in
the natural world. Video games not only geographically isolate the individual from the
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world (when engaged), they also reveal very little about the world in their engagement.
This contrasts with writing, which may also be done in isolation, but the difference is that
it seeks to illuminate the world around the individual in some way.58 Essentially, Pirsig
applies his concept o f Quality too broadly in attempting to reconcile technology with
society.
Still, one has to wonder about the individual who engages computer programming,
or video games, and actually takes the time to learn about the functioning of these things
while at the same time attempting to excel at them. If this individual experiences no
frustration or alienation from technology (i.e., the problem of technology is virtually non
existent with him/her), then these endeavors might function in a similar fashion to the focal
practice. They may not be the best types of focal practices,, but for these individuals they
appear to serve this purpose.
Finally, Borgmann’s discussion of focal things and practices appears to contribute
to Burke’s (1973) notion of “counter nature,” and the potential technology has for
allowing the individual to engage it in such a way that a false perception of effort is
experienced (e.g., in driving, and the perceived feeling of power individuals can experience
when they accelerate by pressing down on the gas pedal). It is easy for individuals to slip
into a mindset that they are exerting effort in a given situation, when it is in fact
technology which is producing the effort. By adopting a focal concern, the phenomenon
of technology is placed in the background of daily life, and it becomes easier for
individuals to recognize not only what technology is doing, but what it is doing fo r them.
It is implied that the individual will now have a better understanding of this distinction.
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Technology and Society
Coping with technology in a way that ensures fulfillment is a challenge for the
modem individual. The phenomenon itself looms large in virtually every sphere of life
nowadays. The suggestion that technology is omnipresent would not be far from the
truth. Moreover, the images of technology that appear in current magazines such as
Wired are glamorous and forward-looking, but also cold, in that innovations such as home
computers are continually becoming more powerful —at a rate sometimes appearing to be
beyond human control). Technology’s seemingly relentless development creates the
potential for a more distant relationship with its “pioneers” and users. Commodification
and consumption proliferate in an environment where technology and advertising
campaigns (among other influences) create persuasive, seductive images of “the good'
life.” These images increasingly consist of newer technologies, such as highspeed
gadgets, big-screen televisions, powerful personal computers, etc. It is a genre of
discourse (though visual appeals hold.great persuasive power, as well) all to its own —one
which embraces commodification and seeks to expand the growing realm of consumption.
However, there are ways for the individual to cope with technology that are less extreme
than creating a revolution against it. Borgmann’s (1984) discussion of focal things and
practices presents the individual with such a method for coping with technology.
If individuals can define themselves in ways that place the phenomenon of
technology in the background of daily life, concepts like the device paradigm will cease to
exist. That is, individuals will no longer feel as though everything about their lives is
driven by technology. Rather, technology will be assessed at the level of what it has to
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offer the individual. Freedom and fulfillment will proliferate, but proper physical and
mental engagement of the body may not have to occur through focal practices. In other
words, it may be enough for an individual to physically engage his or her body at work,
and then rely upon focal practices for mental engagement (e.g., with writing). Thus, the
focal practice can produce fulfillment without allowing for significant physical engagement
of the body.
Focal things and practices contribute to a focal concern, and it is this concern
which allows society to address relevant issues of its time. By adopting a focal concern,
and arriving at some sort of consensus or list of priorities where issues that affect all of
society are concerned, discussion at a “mass” level can lead to decisions about such issues
(e.g., the current trend of genetic engineering, and how work in this field should proceed).
A focal concern can contribute at the level of the individual (focal things and practices) as
well as the societal level (discourse about societal issues). Thus, it is one method of
resolving the conflict between the extreme technological deterministic position and the
positions which characterize technology either as an unstoppable but positive force, or as
nothing more than an innocuous tool. The latter positions are closer to each other in
relation than the deterministic position, since they characterize technology more positively.
In attempting to resolve the conflict between these positions, technology is seen as a force
in its own right (much like the deterministic and “positive force” positions), such as
through the device paradigm, and the potential it holds for creating feelings of frustration
and alienation from technology in individuals. However, it is a force which can be coped
with in modem society.
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Monitoring the phenomenon of technology and its impact on society must remain
an ongoing process. As mentioned, changes as well as shifts in values are worthy issues
to probe in researching technology. Also, examining the ways the body is implicated in
discussions of technology is certainly relative to a given time period as well as culture.
This point appears to justify ongoing examination of the body vis-a-vis technology.
Essentially, the phenomenon of technology is one that will remain open for discussion and
critique as long as it plays a role in the lives of its “pioneers.” Its role may change shape,
but notwithstanding a revolution against its entirety, technology will continue to be a
pervasive force in modem society.
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ENDNOTES

1. One such web address is the following: http://www.df.lth.se/~micke/wholemanifesto.hfml. The
Manifesto can be recovered in full text from other web-sites as well. The page numbers o f the
Manifesto that get referenced are with respect to its layout from this particular Internet address (pp.
1-52). The site belongs to Mikael G. Niklasson.
2. Technology often gets traced to the ancient Greek techne, which Aristotle characterized as an
art concerned with the matter o f “making,” not “doing.” This “making” is driven by reason, and
the link to technology exists in that technology is in effect the innovative process with a belief
based in reason that such innovations will benefit the individual, community, society...etc. See
Kennedy (1991) for a discussion o f techne as he briefly takes up Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.
Worthy o f mention is Hide’s (1993) discussion o f this distinction between “making” and “doing”
with respect to techne, and how the “doing” o f technology is seen today as more important than the
aesthetically determined technology Classical Greece focused upon (see specifically p. 26).
3. I am speaking here o f modem day society in general, and specifically American society, though
other societies across the globe are certainly implicated here as well.
4. By environment I include those natural resources that directly affect the well-being o f the
human species. There are a growing number o f people expressing concern over the natural
environment in its own right. However, this is simply meant to emphasize the significance o f the
technology-environment issue by highlighting the concerns coming to the foreground with most
people, not just environmentalists, deep ecologists, eco-feminists...etc. The issue o f technology
and the environment is the most pressing one involving technology that’s being discussed today.
Questions such as: Will there be enough oil in 50 years?, Can we sustain an environment with
decent air quality?, and What does the future hold fo r the Greenhouse Effect and the ozone layer?
implicate or are implicated by technology.
5. Pirsig used to teach English/Rhetoric at Montana State University at Bozeman —hence the
reference. Interestingly enough, Quality has become a buzzword in the 1980s and 1990s, capable
o f multiple meanings. It is a slogan in many American organizations today (e.g., Ford Motor
Company: “Quality is job one.”). This is not to say that Pirsig has started a “Quality revolution,”
but rather just to make an observation.
6. Brian Paul has an interesting site devoted specifically to links about the Unabomber, the
Manifesto, or a discussion o f the ideas presented in the Manifesto. The address is
<http://users.andara.com/~bpaul/unabomber.html>. One o f the links from the site is an antigovernment page supporting Kaczynski and selling t-shirts which reflect this support (Mendoza,
<http://www.mayhem.net.Crime/unabombshirts.html>).
7. It can be argued that there are in fact three themes to the book: the narrative o f the cross-country
motorcycle trip, the intellectual framework set forth by the narrator, and the story o f Phaedrus. I
choose to consider this final component as being a part of one o f the previous two, simply because
much o f the discussion pertaining to Phaedrus is part o f either the narrative or the intellectual
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framework that Pirsig develops, depending on where in the book the reader finds himself or
herself.
8. Pirsig gives this character the name Phaedrus because the term was believed to be translated as
“lone wolf,” and Pirsig characterizes his former self as a loner - somewhat removed from the rest
o f society. Pirsig notes in the forward o f the 25th anniversary o f Zen and the Art o f Motorcycle
Maintenance that this was an error on his part, as the term Phaedrus is in fact more accurately
translated as “brilliant” or “radiant.”
9. Pirsig is specifically calling for caring in one’s relationship with technology and its innovations.
There is no specific reference in the book to a caring for one another as people. Instead, the
emphasis is placed on the individual and the technology that s/he engages.
10. This dichotomy o f real or fundamental activities and surrogate or pale substitutes for them is
an important one to keep in mind.
11. Kaczynski carries this style throughout his work, whereas Pirsig utilizes a different overall
style to correspond with the multiple themes present in his work. This will be discussed in what
follows.
12. In fact, one o f the first sections (“The Psychology o f Modem Leftism”) does not seem to
address either specifically, but later gets reintroduced into the discussion when Kaczynski
advocates that revolutionaries ought to not associate themselves with this movement, thus falling
into the category o f strategy, or “how” we ought to respond to the problem.
13. Few people residing in America during the winter o f 1973-74 forget about the OPEC oil
embargo.
14. For the most part, I am referring to the body in its physical sense. Worthy o f mention again is
that Pirsig implicates both the physical and mental aspects o f the body. Progress needs to be made
in both areas, he argues, and the efforts grounded in both aspects o f the body serve to illustrate his
commitment to a Zen Buddhist philosophy, where striving for oneness is the focus.
15. One can see that the work o f Martin and Faludi possesses subtle connections to postmodern
theorizing in general and Foucauldian theorizing specifically, by the ways the body gets discussed
differently from how society normally discusses it. The difference is that Martin and Faludi
outline the ways the body is being reconceptualized through the transformation/development o f
American society. Foucault takes a more assertive stance in arguing that the ways the body is
conceptualized are flawed to begin with, examples being with respect to how human sexuality is
conceptualized (1978) and how we discipline ourselves at the both the societal and individual
levels (1977). Angela Trethewey (1999) provides such a Foucauldian analysis o f the way
women’s bodies are conceptualized in the organizational/professional sector, and how they a)
choose to discipline their bodies, and b) are expected to discipline their bodies.
16. For examples o f other work which focuses on the body in analyzing a text(s), but is unrelated
to or less related to a direct examination o f the phenomenon o f technology, see Houck (1997),
Hayden (1998), Kirkmayer (1992), and Culbertson (1995).
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17. This is not to say that metaphors involving the body and technology do not exist in the other
theme o f the book, the intellectual framework Pirsig develops. I will demonstrate that this is also
the case. This is merely to make the point that such metaphors are predominantly located in the
prior theme, and serve to make the connection o f the body and coping with technology between
both themes.

18.1 use the term “product” in a broad sense, including everything from food to homes.
Additionally, while I realize that many societies experience this type o f freedom o f choice, I also
recognize that others simply do not.
19. One such example can be seen in the advent o f electronic mail.
20. The terms freedom and autonomy will be defined and/or developed more by Kaczynski later.
21. Kaczynski argues that it is not enough to apply the power process in any manner, but that it
must be directed toward real goals (as opposed to surrogate activities). This will be discussed
later in this section o f the analysis and in even more detail in the “Implicated Body” section.
22. This discussion o f biological needs and physical effort will recieve much greater attention in
the “Implicated Body” section of my analysis.
23. When I use the term modern man and the masculine follow-up him I am for the most part
using Kaczynski’s own words as they appear in the Manifesto.
24. Consider current advances in and prospects fo r cloning. Additionally, one can examine the
progress o f the Human Genome Project, and its potential implications.
25. Remember the “drunk with a barrell o f wine” analogy?
26. Or control by large organizations, for that matter.
27. Kaczynski also uses the term pow er frequently in his discussion, but this term is attached to a
process (the power process) which he argued was necessary for most individuals to experience.
<Freedom>, or autonomy, is a core component o f this process, as I discussed. This is why the
term pow er did not receive significant attention as a synonym to <ffeedom> in discussing the
Manifesto.
28. Actually, Pirsig mentions that John’s frustration with the cycle in this incident is a result o f his
lack o f knowledge in the area o f general maintenance o f the cycle. John had the choke in the
wrong position, and eventually flooded the engine by repeatedly trying to kick-start the cycle. This
leads into a later argument o f Pirsig’s: that striving for Quality can lead to increased <freedom>.
29. In fact, John had tried to fix the faucet by inserting a new washer. When this did not work, he
gave up on the matter.
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30. <Freedom> that takes the form o f peace o f mind, fulfillment, creativity, control/power...etc.
31. This is not to argue that there was a time when consumers were completely uncritical o f these
things, but merely to assert that this level o f awareness is heightened in times o f prosperity.
People are able to devote more attention to things such as “product quality.”
32. Pirsig’s employment o f the concept peace o f mind will be discussed even further in the
“Implicated Body” section o f this analysis. Particularly, he will address the various levels at which
this occurs when one is striving for Quality
33. This diagram appears in the “Review and Preview” section. It should also be noted that a
return to the notion o f the ideograph at a more theoretical level will occur in the “Discussion”
section o f the Thesis.
34. This is not to say that the concepts o f frustration, security, and/or purposelessness have gone
unaddressed in my analysis o f the Manifesto. Rather, they have received attention, but are always
connected to the more primary concepts used by Kaczynski: <ffeedom> and autonomy.
35. Additionally, it is at this point that a proper engagement of/with the body will be achieved,
which is the focus o f the “Implicated Body” section o f my analysis, to be taken up next. Pirsig on
the other hand argues that individuals must first engage their body (physically and mentally) by
striving for Quality in order to arrive at <freedom>.
36. Kaczynski alludes to the potential for only a handful o f extremely powerful
individuals/organizations to assume control over the majority o f the population, though it is
warned that perhaps even these individuals may succumb to technological power.
3 7 . 1 did utilize a section that I called “Autonomy as Necessity” to discuss Kaczynski’s argument
that all or most individuals have a general need for autonomy in pursuing their goals. It could be
argued that this section is not a reflection o f Kaczynski’s belief that individuals must break free
from society in order to ensure <freedom> (step one in his proposed process). However, this
section is meant to explicate Kaczynski’s general argument about Human Beings’ need for
autonomy. I would add to this that, even at a more subtle level, Kaczynski is drawing his reader to
step one o f his proposed process by first stating this need that individuals have. It is in later
sections that he argues this need is not properly being met, due to the structure o f modem society.
38. Again, product could mean toothpaste, a home, a job...etc.
39. I’ve previously mentioned that these two concepts are more interwoven than they are separate.
40. These psychological problems, along with their connection to freedom, have been discussed in
the ideographic section o f the analysis.
41. Kaczynski adds that there are some non-vital pursuits which are not surrogate activities, such
as sex and love. In other words, individuals will feel a need for these things even if their vital
needs are met.
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42. Kaczynski does little to draw the connection between the body, the power process, and why
surrogate activities do not suffice in this respect (keeping in mind that freedom is a significant
component here). As a result, the reader is left to infer, as I am also doing here, the connection.
The ambiguity that exists here appears to be problemmatic, and will be taken up later.
43. The mention o f the word control here is suggestive o f the fact that a notion o f freedom is also
closely implicated in this argument.
44. It is important to keep this point in mind, as it will be the basis for part o f the upcoming
analysis. One theme o f the text addresses the cross country motorcycle trip, while another theme
is utilized by Pirsig to make more theoretical and reflective statements about the nature o f
Quality. It is in this theme that the body becomes directly implicated, as it is the vehicle through
which the individual can achieve Quality (mentally and physically). The body will also be
implicated in the story theme, and this implication will receive attention.
45. More concrete examples o f this will be offered later.
46. One could argue that part o f what contributes to this perceived lack o f craftsmanship today is
increased levels o f specialization at the workplace. Much o f the creative freedom that existed in
the jobs o f forty and fifty years ago has been replaced by more specialized occupations. This
issue, along with the ways individuals can counter this, will be taken up in the “Discussion”
section.
47. Unless perhaps the individual has had time to simmer and rest on the issue. This will be
addressed shortly
48. Ideally, Pirsig would argue that the solution to traps like fatigue and impatience is to take a
little time away from this particular Quality pursuit and return to it when one is rested. In this
particular instance though, it appears that the four characters did not have much choice in the
matter.
49. It is interesting that the individual has to search for something like high-Quality tools. In
Pirsig’s ideal world, individuals who produce things like tool sets will also be striving for Quality.
I should add to this that Pirsig would likely argue that even if an individual has high-quality tools
to work with, it can still be the case the s/he uses the wrong tools when working toward Quality.
50. Certainly there exist activities/pursuits where muscular insensitivity is not so much as a factor.
Pirsig is only referring to those activities where this potential trap comes into play.
51. Again, Kaczynski employs the concept freedom much more explicitly than Pirsig, so there will
be greater ambiguity for the reader o f Zen and the Art o f Motorcycle Maintenance.
52. In explicating Borgmann’s (1984) work, little will be said about freedom, though this concept
is implied in much the same way that Pirsig implies it.
53. This is for the most part true, since Kaczynski’s discussion o f freedom appears at both ends o f
his overall argument for how we as a society ought to procure it (refer back to diagram). That is,
individuals must first break free from society in order to arrive at step two, which includes
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in c r e a s e d le v e ls o f fr e e d o m .
54. Borgmann observes that not every focal practice entails physical effort. Take the art of
writing, for example, which is for the most part strictly a mental pursuit. Additionally, many
activities disguise themselves as focal practices even though they are not. Examples o f these will
be addressed later.
55. Additionally, the body Kaczynski implicates in his discussion o f technology (and coping with
technology) is strictly a masculine one. References to “modem man” are frequent in the
Manifesto, and the type o f future Kaczynski advocates is one which preferences the male
experience o f the power process (e.g., males engage their bodies “properly” by hunting, herding,
fishing, building, etc. It is through these types o f activities that fulfillment is procured, and it is
males that are implied to engage these activities).
56. However, skiing can become a “high-tech” sport in its own right, as some individuals choose
to rely on the newest gadgets for skiing while others are content to incorporate only the necessities,
in addition to relying on older equipment.
57. One could argue that “the road” is a focal thing and riding the cycle is the focal practice, but
Borgmann would argue that at the level o f practice, no real skill is needed by the cycle rider. Or if
so, it is only a minimal amount o f skill.
58. This is the case for many traditional arts, such as music, poetry, painting, sculpting, etc.
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